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***CEEYouth: The comparative study of young migrants from Poland and Lithuania in the context of Brexit.***

***Combining public statistics, web-survey and asynchronous interviewing***

Dominika Blachnicka-Ciacek  
Izabela Grabowska  
Daniela Hekiart  
Paula Pustulka  
Justyna Sarnowska  
Agnieszka Trąbka  
Iga Wermńska-Wisnicka  
Egidijus Barcevičius  
Irma Budginaite-Mackine  
Dovile Jonaviciene  
Luka Klimaviciute  
Juste Vezikauskaite  
Violetta Parutis

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Polish Team (alphabetical order): Dominika Blachnicka-Ciacek, Izabela Grabowska, Daniela Hekiert, Paula Pustulka, Justyna Sarnowska, Agnieszka Trąbka, Iga Werminska-Wisnicka

Lithuanian Team (alphabetical order): Egidijus Barcevicus, Irma Budginaite-Mackine, Dovile Jonaviciene, Luka Klimaviciute, Juste Vezikauskaite

UK Collaboration: Violetta Parutis

**Młodzi w Centrum Lab / Youth Research Center**

Uniwersytet SWPS / *SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities*

Chodakowska 19/31

03-815 Warsaw, Poland

e-mail: [youth@swps.edu.pl](mailto:youth@swps.edu.pl)

**ABSTRACT*****CEEYouth: The comparative study of young migrants from Poland and Lithuania in the context of Brexit. Combining public statistics, web survey and asynchronous interviewing***

This Working Paper introduces the theoretical considerations and empirical design of the ongoing research project, entitled: *CEEYouth: The comparative study of young migrants from Poland and Lithuania in the context of Brexit*, which is carried out by the Youth Research Center at the SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities and by the Public Policy and Management Institute (PPMI) in Vilnius, lasting from 2018 to 2021. It captures the life pathways of the young migrants (aged 19 to 34) from the new EU Member States, namely Poland and Lithuania living in the present-day Great Britain. Given the floating political climate, with a culmination of the approaching, yet still unknown form of Brexit, it influences social, economic and institutional areas of living. Young migrants are particularly exposed to the consequences of this unravelling events.

The main goal of the project is threefold: (1) to uncover the social anchors of migrating youth; (2) to verify their awareness of the social risks, and (3) to track their coping strategies in the context of Brexit. The data is collected both at the individual (e.g. well-being, sense of belonging) and at the social (e.g. changes in the policies and living conditions) levels of analysis. The comparison of migrants from the same Central European region, yet different ethnic groups, but usually put in the analyses into the same 'box' might contribute to the better understanding of the experiences of young people facing the the Brexit and other unfolding structural events.

The project will apply an innovative and comprehensive mixed method research design (MMR) combining qualitative and quantitative data which involves; secondary data analysis (public statistics from Labour Force Surveys: Polish, Lithuanian and British); where also non-migrants are captured; a dedicated exploratory web survey (CAWI) and asynchronous interviews lasting 24 months with young mobile Poles and Lithuanians. The MMR relies on the component composite design (Caracelli & Greene, 1997), balancing the qualitative and quantitative items (Creswell, 2009; Mason, 2006).

**Keywords:** mixed method research (MMR), asynchronous interviews, web survey (CAWI), secondary data analysis, young migrants from Poland and Lithuania, Brexit

**Corresponding author:**

Dominika Blachnicka-Ciacek

E-mail: [d.blachnicka-ciacek@swps.edu.pl](mailto:d.blachnicka-ciacek@swps.edu.pl)

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## 1. Introduction

This Working Paper has been developed in the context of the Brexit negotiations which followed referendum three years earlier on the 23<sup>rd</sup> of June 2016 and the formal date of exit of the United Kingdom (UK) from the European Union (EU) which was meant to happen on the 29<sup>th</sup> of March 2019. **We see Brexit not a single, one-off, big-bang event. It is an unfolding, even open-ended, structural process which might eventually impact on the life courses of people, and young people in particular as they experience their critical biographical transitions.** Therefore the process of societal transformation has already started in the British society, having spillover effects on both the UK's non-migrants as well as migrants and therefore also on their respective countries of origin.

In the *CEEYouth: The comparative study of young migrants from Poland and Lithuania in the context of Brexit* we treat Brexit as 'a trigger' to wider conceptual deliberations and empirical findings on how structural events such as Brexit are reflected or not in the life course trajectories of geographically mobile people in the reference to their left behind.

In the *CEEYouth* project **our aim is not to overstate and overestimate the Brexit process but to put it into the wider context** or even to juxtapose it with other structural events relevant for particular birth cohorts of Poles and Lithuanians. In particular we consider, the breakdown of state socialism in 1989; memberships of NATO; terrorist attack on World Trade Center in 2001; memberships of the EU; war in Ukraine; economic crisis of 2008 and other events important for both young Poles and young Lithuanians<sup>1</sup> (see App. 1).

Therefore, the main aim of this Working Paper directly conceptually corresponds with the aims of the *CEEYouth* research project relating to: (1) exploring social anchors and differentiated embedding of young migrants, but also the processes of unanchoring and re-anchoring upon eventual return; (2) investigating social risks faced by young migrants in the context of structural events, in the light of Brexit; (3) dynamically analysing life trajectories of young movers and stayers in relation to their transitions to adulthood and an eventual disruption of these processes caused by structural, contextual events.

This Working Paper is divided into five parts: (1) this introduction; (2) literature review leading to the theoretical design of the *CEEYouth* project; (3) the presentation of objectives, research questions and hypotheses of the *CEEYouth* project; (4) the detailed presentation of the methodological design of the *CEEYouth* project, with its mix-method innovative research approach where both quantitative (public statistics and a dedicated web survey) and qualitative (synchronous and asynchronous interviewing) components are in constant dialogue and synergy with each other.

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<sup>1</sup> By structural events we mean different macro-political, social and economic circumstances that may impact upon life trajectories.

## 2. Literature review

### 2.1. Brexit as the social context of migrants

To understand the multifaceted effects of Brexit, one needs to analyze and comprehend the context in which young, post-EU accession migrants operated since their arrival into the United Kingdom. Within the vast literature, the key themes that concerned researchers of the CEE migration flows, have been identified by Burrell (2010) as **staying, returning, working and living**. Crucially, all four of these realms take on a new shape and meaning as the Brexit talks are unfolding. A comparative perspective on “pre” and “post” Brexit research themes and voices from the field is needed for having a more evidence-based grasp on what the implications within the present context of “the Brexit year” and in the upcoming years might be.

In addition to the themes of stay/return plans, employment and living, to tie in this review with the goals of the CEEYouth project, we also reflect on the question of belonging. This is because, as far as belonging is concerned, we note a paramount difference in how it is framed since the Referendum as compared to previous research. Notably, since the EU accession in 2004, the scholarly efforts centered on finding and pinpointing traits of integration and new forms of belonging that the CEE migrants have been said to forge in the UK (see e.g., Botterill, 2011; Ryan, 2018). At present, an emergent narrative sees Brexit as a rupture and questions the underpinnings of the European migrants’ belonging in Britain. Consequently, it is being discussed whether Polish and Lithuanian migrants can even belong to the ‘host society’ that makes them feel unwelcome (Botterill, 2018; Sime et al., 2017; Rzepnikowska 2019).

Starting off with the **staying/returning** question, a literature review shows that we seem to be witnessing a reinvigoration of the research interest in the effects of Brexit on the settlement, further migration and return plans of the UK-based EU migrants. This appears to work in a cyclical manner because the first wave of the crafted typologies about return-plans (or lack thereof) of the Polish migrants has been formulated shortly after the mass migration in the immediate post-accession years. These famous typologies were important in the face of a massive influx and arrival of the A8 populations, with a clear policy interest on the probabilities ascribed to the migrants settling down. As such, researchers attempted to make determination about future plans of Central and Eastern European “workers” - with Eade et al. (2006), for instance, popularizing metaphors of searchers/stayers and hamsters/storks (see also Engbersen et al. 2013, Krings et al., 2016; Okólski, Salt, 2014). In the same vein, now we seem to be preoccupied again with the upheaval of the Brexit vote and its meaning for mobility strategizing (e.g., Simionescu et al., 2017; Miller, 2019).

Stepping back, while the initial assessment made about newly arrived post-accession migrants underlined a tendency of the CEE populations in the UK to deliberately make no plans, engage in the sort of “floating” or “weightlessness” (Favell, 2008), there was a caveat within the generalization about “intentional unpredictability” (Eade et al.,

2005). In fact, although a bulk of migrant trajectories appeared to be chaotic, spontaneous or even haphazard, a temporal and life-course-driven perspective signalled a change over time (see e.g., White, 2011; Ryan, 2018). In fact, there were no visible structural barriers to integration or - rather - **social anchoring** (Grzymała-Kazłowska, 2017, see. p. 17) and **differentiated embedding** (Ryan 2018) that Polish and Lithuanian migrants began to engage in. This was tied with the new demographic markers as the unattached free-floating populations exchanged deliberate indeterminacy for settling down with families, sending children to British schools, constructing homes and buying property in the United Kingdom (see e.g., White, 2011; Ryan et al., 2011; Parutis, 2011; Pustułka, 2014; Heath et al., 2012; McGhee et al., 2015). From a macro-sociological standpoint, the conditions for attachment to place were also encouraging, as generous welfare state and overall positive societal view of the CEE migrants could pave way for people feeling at home and transforming their dedicated non-planning to permanent settlement through personalized and voluntary choices of their new place of belonging (e.g. Anderson et al., 2007). However, some of the unequivocally positive takes on CEE migrant settlement processes have been problematized by pointing to existing 'counter-productive' practices of immigrant place-making (Gill, 2010) or using racializing practices as a way of finding a place in Britain's status hierarchies (Fox and Mogilnicka, 2017).

Quite radically, the structural and legal change that lies in the politics around the Brexit vote upturned the social climate surrounding migrants. Even though the broad thematization of research informing social policy and politics as regards to whether migrants are "here to stay" has been prominent throughout the last 15 years, it seems to be reemerging with full force as the Referendum shook the very core of what could or could not be planned, predicted and strategized (see Lulle et al., 2017; Botterill, 2018; Simionescu et al., 2017). However, what we do see as a key contextual dimension for the post-Brexit issue is a shift from "intentional unpredictability" (Eade et al., 2005) to what might be called an "unintentional indeterminacy" or what McGhee and colleagues explicitly termed "undeliberate determinacy" (2017). The recently released data on the applications for "settled status" may, on the one hand, support the claim about the postponement and avoidance of making a decision as only 3% of Polish migrants and less than 4% of Lithuanian migrants (compared to 18% of Bulgarians) have submitted their applications. On the other hand, the reasons behind it might be multifold, the fact that the process has just started and the applications can be made until the end of 2020 notwithstanding. Nevertheless, migrants' belonging is inevitably questioned in the context of the 'hostile environment' (Jones et. al, 2017) and they feel increasingly "othered", forced to provide evidence about their right to be in the United Kingdom (Lulle et al., 2017; Miller, 2019; McGhee et al., 2017; Currie, 2016). Instances of racism and xenophobia are being reported, while migrants themselves experience and report personal traumas, shock and a new, extremely heightened uncertainty about what the future might bring (Rzepnikowska, 2018; Guma & Dafydd Jones, 2018).

While there is a consensus regarding the questioned sense of belonging and general uncertainty about the impending consequences of Brexit, the migrants' coping strategies like regulating one's legal status, investing in education, stability of employment, among others, remain an open question. So does the option to return. It is difficult to

estimate the scale of the returns. First, due to the ‘discrepancy between *planned* and *actual* return’ (McGhee et al., 2017: 2110) and secondly owing to the ‘unpredictability’ declared in the early research on the consequences of the vote and deal. In a survey conducted by McGhee et al. (2017), only 5% of migrant respondents declared the intention to return, while over 20% had no plans of taking any sort of particular actions after Brexit. Interestingly, as far as determining migrants’ plans for future are concerned, previously significant factors such as the length of stay or family situation turned out to be less important than migrants’ attitudes towards the UK and British citizenship, awareness of one’s civic rights, and the level of socio-cultural integration (McGhee et al., 2017: 2123).

Nevertheless, across projects, interviewees discern a paradox of having been able to create their sense of belonging at their own pace for years, to a sudden external requirement of needing to pledge allegiance. For the most part, the shift is also from an individualistic agency that was inherent to the free-movement and engendered - especially for the young migrants - a conviction about the desirability of being a cosmopolitan nomad, a “Eurostar” (Conradson and Latham, 2005; Favell, 2008). Nonetheless, a pivotal political event at a macro-level now has vital consequences for the new strategies that are no longer about a personal connection to place but rather utilitarian and strict in terms of systemic indicators. As such, we can observe social pressures that push migrants towards legal decisions about citizenship, residency status and other forms of bureaucratic evidencing of one’s right to stay. In the above mentioned survey by McGhee et al. (2017: 2116), over 70% of the respondents plan to apply for either permanent residence permit or a British citizenship. It seems, however, that this ‘mobilizing effect’ stems not necessarily from a firm intention to settle down in the UK, but rather from an entertaining a desire to have all options still open and viable, regardless of the Brexit’s outcomes.

Moving on to **employment and working** lives, the economic lens was deterministic in the investigations of financial and employment-related motivations of the Polish and Lithuanian migration to the UK (e.g., Eade et al., 2006; Kaczmarczyk, Tyrowicz, 2015; Žvalionytė, 2015; Barcevičius, Žvalionytė, 2012). Despite the fact that post-accession migrants were often marked as affected by deskilling and working in the secondary sector of the labour market (Trevena, 2013; Nowicka, 2012), the overall consensus was that being able to work for a decent wage was more than young individuals could have achieved in their home countries at the time (Kaczmarczyk, Tyrowicz, 2015; Sarnowska et al., 2018).

With the passage of time, after several years in the UK, many migrants managed to move from a secondary labour market upwards and found jobs corresponding with their qualifications (Parutis, 2011). As Lulle et al. (2017: 8) demonstrated, those who managed to build a career in the UK, highlight their right to belong based on being a “good” and “valuable” migrants, paying taxes etc. This economic narrative is seen as a legitimate way of countering the unsettling discourse with empirical rather than emotional arguments. Grabowska and Jastrzebowska (2019, forthcoming; Grabowska 2019) showed both in quantitative and qualitative data that migration does have an impact on tacit dimensions of human capital such as social skills, both on their individual (cognitive and intrapersonal) and relational (interpersonal) dimensions. Those who have low-skilled job are probably more vulnerable to the possible fluctuations in the labour market and express their fears about the future (cf. Duda-Mikulin 2019 in relations to female workers from Poland in the

UK). In that sense, post-Brexit climate reiterates what Botterill (2011: 52) argued, namely that “structural inequalities are at the core of the everyday realities of mobile people lived out through ‘constrained choice’ and ‘reduced access’ to resources”.

Finally, the topic of **living** has been initially connected with the discourse of a “normal life” (Galasińska, Kozłowska 2009; Lopez Rodriguez, 2010; McGhee et al., 2012). Living in the UK was positioned as standing in stark opposition to how life in the countries of origin has been somewhat abnormal, mostly due to economic conditions but also when seen through the lens of housing, having children, and the general aspects of the quality of life and attainable lifestyle. In this sense, pre-Brexit narratives of the Poles in the UK often underscored fulfilment of a need to slow down, having just and non-discriminatory work experiences, systemic support for families and so on - all pointing out the beyond-financial perceptions of the generally improved quality of life (White, 2011; Rabikowska, Burrell, 2010; Pustułka, 2016). Living in a generally welcoming transnational space, migrants were also seen as taking advantage of their social capital and working towards various life goals - be it in the family, career or personal interests’ realms (Grabowska, 2019; Lopez Rodriguez, 2016). Thus, although practical implications of Brexit remain uncertain, in the affective domain Brexit referendum is perceived as a shock and a rupture in the relatively settled lives of the CEE migrants (Miller, 2019; Currie, 2016). Here particularly frustrating was the fact that although migration, specifically migration from the CEE Europe, was at the centre of the Brexit debate, migrants themselves were excluded from the actual Brexit referendum vote and their identity as non-British nationals was suddenly not only highlighted, but made problematic. As such, this may also lead to the consolidation of the EU nationals living in the UK and the recourse to the shared European identity (Ranta & Nancheva, 2018).

This review would not be completed without emphasizing that all themes suffer from the lack of consensus and numerous gaps in the research surfacing post-Brexit-Referendum, especially on the life course, dynamic perspective. One of the main gaps observed in the literature about the CEE migration to the UK, which is also of key importance for the Brexit context, is the continuous absence of a generational/life-course perspective. To clarify, it lacks the focus on subsequent age groups - for instance in the descriptions of differentiated experiences of various family members, among other age groupings (see e.g., White, 2011). Yet there seems to be a dichotomy between observing youth and adolescents that are mostly seen as arriving with their parents and the grown-up migrants at different stages of early, mid and late adulthood. As the *CEEYouth* project pertains to the young populations, we see belonging as differentiated generationally (see also Szewczyk 2015) and intersectional in terms of both social class and gender (see e.g. Pustułka 2016). This means that the key aspects of belonging as an idea will vary significantly between cohorts and people with distinct types of mobility and specific socio-demographic characteristics (see also Popyk, et al. 2019, Grabowska & Jastrzebowska forthcoming 2019; Grabowska, 2019).

From a temporal stance, it is apparent that ‘young migrants’ now encompass both the people who grew up in Poland/Lithuania and migrated to the UK as adults, and those who were “brought on” the ‘host country’ as (young) children of migrants. As for the former, many young people moved abroad as adults, after finishing education in their

countries of origin. This has certainly been the case for Poland, wherein the generational experience of being “socialized to migrate” (White 2011) culminated in young and educated cohorts being overrepresented in the migratory flows to the UK (Slany et al. 2016, Grabowska 2012b, 2019, Kaczmarczyk, Tyrowicz 2015). In simple terms, they constituted the category of economic migrants, with educational or lifestyle mobility most recently discovered for the Millennials (see Pustułka et al. in reviews). The latter category of the children of Polish/Lithuanian migrants has mostly been examined in regards to their presence in the UK schooling system (see e.g. Ryan, D’Angelo 2011, Sime, Fox 2015, Young 2019). However, they will likely exhibit alternate types of belonging, presumably with weaker connections to their parents’ countries and localities of origin. In this realm, one must point out Daniela Sime’s research on what it means to be young and suddenly feel unwelcome in the country one grew up in. Notably, 1.5 generation’s anxieties stem from the sense of being suddenly uprooted from the country they had perceived as their home and from more pragmatic concerns about the possibility to pursue their education in the UK (tuition fees at universities, access to student loans etc.; Sime et al., 2017; Sime, 2018). Similarly, Sara Young (2019) examines this aspect for adolescents, again showing the pervasiveness of xenophobia and ethnicization that the younger generation growing up in the UK must face.

Summing up, it needs to be stated that the early post-Referendum research consistently indicates that the Brexit vote and the discourse connected to it had an emotional impact on the EU migrants living in the UK. It questioned their sense of feeling at home and could disrupt the processes of social anchoring/belonging. It resulted in the sense of uncertainty, insecurity and a deprecated wellbeing. These risk-ridden social conditions are difficult to cope with, even more so when one takes into account so many unanswered questions regarding the actual happenings and consequences of Brexit still being left up in the air. There was an upsurge of applications for the permanent residence certificate and for the British citizenship, but migrants’ specific plans for the next several years remain vague. Referring to the strategy of “intentional unpredictability” (Eade et al., 2007) individually and collectively deployed by many Polish migrants a decade ago, we may argue that we now observe a politically-conceived strategy of “unintentional unpredictability” enforced by the Brexit process.

## 2.2. Young movers and stayers in Poland and in Lithuania in an overview

### 2.2.1. POLAND

#### 2.2.1.1. Who leaves Poland according to Polish data?

Polish public statistics does not keep pace with the contemporary migration patterns. There is no coherent database containing information about Polish migration in the Polish data. Complexity and diversity of contemporary mobility hinders the accurate picture of migration flows and stocks of Polish migrants abroad (Kaczmarczyk, 2015a). Moreover, due to free mobility within the EU, even the definition of a *migrant* is problematic. Statistics Poland applies one methodology for estimating the migration flows (using the definition of

a *permanent migrant*) and the other for estimating the migration stocks (using the definition of a *temporary migrant*). *Seasonal migrants* are not included in any official statistics in Poland. However, although available data is partial and fragmented, it allows to analyse the migration trends of Polish.

Statistics Poland accounts only for two types of migrants. A *permanent migrant* is a person who is deregistered from the residency in Poland. The number of permanent Polish migrants is counted based on the data coming from the central population register (so-called PESEL). The methodology is criticised (Kaczmarczyk, 2015b), as large number of people who leave Poland even permanently never withdraw their registration and are still present in the official Polish registers as Polish inhabitants. Therefore, Statistics Poland estimations seem to be understated.

A *temporary migrant* is defined as a person who stays abroad for a minimum of 3 months<sup>2</sup>. However, s/he is still registered in Poland for a permanent stay, even if the person has been living for many years in a foreign country (Mioduszevska, 2008). Statistics Poland estimations do not account for Polish citizens who are deregistered from a permanent stay in Poland (and registered in another country) nor for seasonal migrants. The official data about the number of Polish inhabitants living temporarily abroad is announced once a year - so-called *migratory stock of Poles* in the other countries (Statistics Poland, 2018a). However, there are only estimations because there is a lack of one consistent database about stocks and flows of Polish migration. Data for the estimations are based on the different sources of data, among others: the national census data, administrative data about registration and deregistration of Polish citizens in Poland, data of quarterly Polish Labour Force Survey, quarterly Labour Force Survey and other official statistics from destination countries (Statistics Poland, 2018a).

Table 1. The number of Polish inhabitants living temporarily abroad

Destination	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
TOTAL – in thousands	1 000	1 450	1 950	2 270	2 210	2 100	2 000	2 060	2 130	2 196	2 320	2 397	2 515	2 540
European Union (27 countries) – in thousands	750	1 170	1 550	1 860	1 820	1 690	1 607	1 670	1 720	1 789	1 901	1 983	2 096	2 112
United Kingdom – in thousands	150	340	580	690	650	595	580	625	637	642	685	720	788	794
Share of migration to UK in total migration	15%	23%	30%	30%	29%	28%	29%	30%	30%	29%	30%	30%	31%	31%
Share of migration to UK in EU migration	20%	29%	37%	37%	36%	35%	36%	37%	37%	36%	36%	36%	38%	38%
% change in the number of Poles migrating temporarily to the UK comparison with previous year	-	127%	71%	19%	-6%	-8%	-3%	8%	2%	1%	7%	5%	9%	1%

\*Poland Statistics, 2018a and own elaborations based on Poland Statistics, 2018a

Source: own estimations based on Statistics Poland.

<sup>2</sup> Till 2016 –minimum 2 months.

Table 1 shows the stocks of people who are permanent Polish inhabitants living temporarily abroad. Analysis of this data depicts the change in the number of Poles in the UK from 2004 till 2017. The largest growth is seen one year after accession to the EU. In 2005 there was an increase of 127% in the number of Poles living temporarily in the UK. As a consequence of the financial crisis, there was a reduction in the number of Poles in the UK in the years 2008-2010. From 2011, there has been an increase in the stock of Poles in the UK. It is more stable and at a moderate pace than the migration trend from before the financial crisis. Nevertheless, now, in the upcoming of Brexit, it seems likely that in 2018 and 2019, there will be more registrations for the permanent or temporary stay in the UK. At the end of 2017, an estimated 794 thousand permanent Polish inhabitants had been living in the UK for the minimum of 3 months (12 thousand more than in the previous year - 1% change).

Table 2. Polish temporary and permanent emigration by age group in 2016

	0-9	10-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	≥70
permanent migrants (migratory flows)	11%	13%	18%	28%	15%	9%	5%	2%
temporary migrants (migratory stocks)	7%	7%	16%	30%	17%	13%	6%	3%

\*Own elaborations based on Demographic Yearbook 2017 and Poland Statistics, 2018a

Source: own elaborations based on Statistics Poland.

The data presented above shows that in 2016 Poles aged 30-39 constitute the largest age group both in migratory flows (28%) and stocks (30%). It is a slightly unexpected result as young Poles (those below 30s) used to be considered the most mobile group (Anacka, 2010). There are a few possible explanations of the above results. The youth is more likely to choose seasonal migration. Youngsters aged 20-29 might be also less prone to register their stay due to the perception of migration as a temporary experience in their lives while people aged 30-39 years are more concentrated on stabilisation and settlement of the family. Therefore, thirty-year-old-person is more willing to register their stay officially. Moreover, this age group includes post-accession migrants (who left Poland after 2004) and who belong to the Polish baby-boom cohort.

### 2.2.1.2. Young Movers

Despite lacking reliable, public statistics on young Polish movers, there are estimations and analyses conducted by researchers which enable us to tell more about the socio-demographic profiles of this group. The youth forms the majority of Polish migrants in the UK (Grabowska-Lusińska & Okólski, 2009). It has been caused by many factors. From the UK perspective, Polish accession to the EU coincides with the high demand for, mainly manual, workers in the UK. At the same time in Poland, Polish baby-boom cohort (born in the early 1980s) was entering the labour market (Okólski & Salt, 2014). At that time, many social sciences and humanities graduates were unable to find the job due to the mismatch of their skills and expectations of employers (Grabowska, 2016a). Shortly after Polish accession, about 72% of Polish migrants in Great Britain were aged 20-29 (Grabowska-

Lusińska & Okólski, 2009, p. 111). Almost 68% of all Polish movers were men at that time (ibid., p. 110). The post-accession Polish migrant tends to be younger and better educated than the pre-accession one (Grabowska, 2016b). Over one-third (32%) of Polish post-accession migrants to the UK have university degrees in comparison with 26% of Polish sedentary population and 21% of native British (Kaczmarczyk & Tyrowicz, 2015, p. 15). In spite of being on average better-educated than British in the post EU-accession period (2007-2010), almost 90% of Polish migrants in the UK work in basic and low skilled jobs (ibid., p. 16).

### 2.2.1.3. Returnees or those who practice return mobilities

It is not only problematic to count Polish migrants, but also Polish return migrants. There is no consistent definition of a *return migrant* (Grabowska-Lusińska & Okólski, 2009) we talk currently about *return mobilities* (King 2017). This is because migration is not linear anymore: from point A to point B and return to point A. It is far more complex, involving both temporary migration and temporary return, as well as multiple migration. Thanks to free mobility rights within the EU, the person who has already come back to Poland from immigration (thus s/he is a return migrant) might in the future be a migrant again (Engbersen et al., 2009). One of the very few available data sources that account for return migration comes for the latest Census (2011), which shows that more than 730 thousand Poles have returned to their country of origin after living abroad for a minimum of 1 year (Statistics Poland, 2013, p. 71).

The financial crisis has caused a shift of choices in terms of the destination countries for Polish migrants, but no mass-return migration was observed (Slany et al., 2018). Based on the Centre for Migration Research estimations, the ratio of Poles, who migrated to the UK at the time of crisis was higher than those returning to Poland (Anacka, 2010, p. 17). It is the family reasons, not the economic incentives that are considered as the main motivation for return from different countries (Slany et al., 2018; Szymańska et al., 2012). Depending on the gender and the migration type, there are different purposes of returning. One model is that the migrant is seasonal (usually the woman) and she left the family in Poland. However, after some time she returns because of missing her children. (Slany et al., 2018). For men, the more popular pattern is that he left Poland to earn money (for example for building the house) and after gaining the target he returns. He might also return due to relationship problems. Moreover, if the whole nuclear family migrated from Poland, their motivation to return might be the necessity to take care of elders in the family (ibidem).

The youth constitutes the largest group amidst returnees (Szymańska et al., 2012, p. 26; Anacka, 2010, p. 20). It is a natural consequence of the fact that the youngsters have predominantly migrated from Poland. However, there is unclear *who* exactly is more willing to return to Poland. According to the survey conducted in Silesia, that is the university graduates who is the most likely to return (Szymańska et al., 2012, p. 26), while CMR research suggests that is the person with vocational training who return (Anacka, 2010, p. 21).

At the time of financial crisis, Iglicka (2009) noticed that well-educated return migrants were prone to „double marginalisation”. They used to work abroad in the

profession below their competencies. Therefore, after return to Poland, they had problems with finding a job according to their qualifications due to lack of job experience in this area (Iglińska, 2009). Anacka and Fihel (2013) showed that the return migrants (regardless of their education) were more prone to be unemployed than non-migrants. The employers used to underestimate the human and social competences of returnees. They tended to look only on the job experience (hard skills) in the resume instead of the other skills and competences (soft skills).

On the basis of the presented analysis, there is a few years old apparent knowledge gap on migration and return migration characteristics. The above mentioned studies have mainly focused on data until 2012. Since the Polish economic situation has dramatically changed since then this might lead to the change of migration and return migration strategies (especially amidst youth). There is also the hypothesis that employers are more prone to appreciate soft skills of migrants now. Therefore, the aim of our secondary data analysis (the methodology in 4.2) is to fill this knowledge gap.

#### 2.2.1.4. Young Stayers

According to Labour Force Survey data for Poland (second quarter, 2018), 59.7% young Poles aged 20-24 were active on the labour market (83.6% for 25-29 age group and 84.1% for 30-34 age group). The unemployment rate for the age cohort of 20-24 was 9.4% (4.9% for the age cohort of 25-29 and 3.6% for the age cohort 30-34). Young stayers were generally more educated than young movers (Kaczmarczyk & Tyrowicz, 2015, p. 10). Moreover, stayers with university diplomas have often more jobs in the career which are consistent with their skills than movers in the UK (ibid., p. 19-21).

Statistics Poland (2017) conducted an analysis dedicated to the young people's (aged 15-34) labour market activity. The analysis showed that 58.1% of young university graduates have a job matching their qualifications. Only 5.7% working Poles aged 15-34 migrated because of taking the current job. Within this group, 24.4% of youngsters migrated to the EU and 71.2% of them are internal migrants.

## 2.2.2. LITHUANIA

### 2.2.2.1. Who leaves Lithuania according to Lithuanian data?

Statistics Lithuania provides the most accurate available data on migration flows of Lithuanians. Each year it publishes how many residents of Lithuania left the country with the intention to remain abroad for a period longer than one year and how many people arrived including both returning Lithuanians and foreigners. According to Statistics Lithuania, from 2004 almost 619 thousand residents left Lithuania and only 194 thousand people have arrived (EMN, 2018). The data are based on declarations of the departure and arrival that, according to Lithuanian law, are obligatory for people who change their place of residence for longer than a 6-month period. However, since not all migrants declare their departure and / or return, some flows stay unaccounted (Žvalionytė, 2014).

Stocks of Lithuanian migrants abroad are estimated based on migratory flows and adjusted every ten years after censuses. According to the data of the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Migration Department, approximately 460 thousand Lithuanians

were living abroad as of 2018. The majority resided in the United Kingdom (46%), Norway (10%), Germany (10%), and Ireland (8%). It was estimated that around 212 thousand Lithuanians lived in the UK in 2018 (EMN, 2018). However, it is difficult to exactly calculate numbers of Lithuanians in the UK due to the fluid nature of the intra-EU migration but also lack of reliable ways of measuring migration. For example, the British national insurance registrations suggest that between 2004 and 2014 there were around 280,000 Lithuanian nationals in the UK (King et al., 2015 p. 7).

The largest recent wave of migration to the UK followed Lithuania’s accession to the EU in 2004 and the start of the global economic recession in 2008 (see Table 3). Roughly half of all Lithuanian migrants choose the UK as their destination (EMN, 2018). While Lithuania’s economic growth was strong and fast in the pre-recession period, it declined rapidly post-2008 and resulted in high levels of unemployment especially among the youth. Although the economic growth recovered after the crisis, the levels of emigration from Lithuania remained high. Recent surveys among high school students in Lithuania suggest that many of them plan to leave Lithuania after finishing secondary education (Aidis & Krupinskaitė, 2017). Many move due to a combination of economic, career, lifestyle and personal-development reasons (King et al., 2018).

Table 3. Emigration of Lithuanian citizens, 2004-2017

Destination	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Total - in thousands	25	55	30	28	22	34	79	52	38	35	33	37	46	45
United Kingdom - in thousands	9	16	8	8	7	10	41	26	20	18	17	19	23	22
Share of migration to the UK in total migration	35%	29%	28%	29%	32%	30%	52%	51%	52%	50%	51%	51%	51%	48%
% change in the number of Lithuanian citizens migrating to the UK in comparison with previous year	-	79%	-47%	-3%	-15%	46%	306%	-35%	-25%	-10%	-6%	13%	22%	-7%

Note: The sharp increase in 2010 might be partly a result of a change in how statistics were tracked. Most likely, some of the people reported as having migrated in 2010 moved in prior years (Žvalionytė, 2012, p. 87).

Source: own elaboration based on Statistics Lithuania (2019c).

The youth are the ones most likely to migrate to the UK compared to other age groups. Of migrants who moved to the UK in 2017, 60% were aged 20-34 (Eurostat, 2018). This comes in contrast to Lithuanian residents, among whom 20-34-year-olds comprised only 20% of the population in 2017 (Statistics Lithuania, 2019a). The youth, therefore, represent a disproportionate share of emigrants compared to people who live in Lithuania. Furthermore, Figure 1 illustrates that although the overall emigration from Lithuania to the UK declined between 2016 and 2017, that was not the case among the young migrants.




Figure 1. Lithuanian migration to the UK by age group, 2013-2017

Source: own elaboration based on Eurostat (2018).

#### 2.2.2.2. Young Movers and Stayers

Regarding migrants' demographic profiles, Lithuanians who move to the UK are split almost evenly between the two genders, which is similar to the gender composition of the stayers (see Figure 2). Of all migrants who moved to the UK in 2017, 49% were men and 51% were women. This is somewhat reflective of the fact that there are overall more women than men in Lithuania. The young migrant cohort is also similar to young stayers in terms of gender balance. Among 20-34-year-old emigrants in 2017, half were men and half were women. This is comparable to Lithuanians residing in Lithuania where men comprise 52% of 20-34-year-old and women 48%.




Figure 2. Lithuanian emigrants to the UK and stayers by gender, 2017

Source: Statistics Lithuania (2019a) and Eurostat (2018).

Other socio-demographic information on Lithuanians migrating to the UK is limited. Based on the data of British national insurance, the majority of them tend to be of young working age (<40), although recent years saw a change in the socio-demographic profile of migrants with more older individuals and families arriving as opposed young singles. According to Hazans (2016), young Lithuanians (aged 15-24) in the UK attained better labour market outcomes than stayers in their home country in the context of economic crisis. Their employment and activity levels in 2011 were similar to those of young stayers in 2017. According to Labour Force Survey data, 60,6% young Lithuanians aged 20-24 were active on the labour market in 2017 (88.9 % for 25-29 age group and 90,1% for 30-34 age group). The unemployment rate for the age cohort of 20-24 was 11% (4,7% for the age cohort of 25-29 and 4,8% for the age cohort 30-34).

However, most relevant sources don't distinguish migration to the UK from general migratory flows of Lithuanians. For example, Statistics Lithuania publishes some information regarding emigrants' marital status, but statistics are aggregated for all emigrants as opposed to those who move to the UK only and are young. The Lithuanian government carries out online surveys of emigrants who live abroad, but the results are also presented in regard to the whole emigrant population as a single entity rather than broken down by country of destination and age (URM, 2019).

Comparing Lithuanian movers and stayers in general, one study found that emigrants tend to be more social orientated, have higher emotional stability, better subjective health, and express less health problems than Lithuanian residents (Kristina Žardekaitė-Matulaitienė, 2010). In another study Lithuanian emigrants reported higher trust in institutions and higher emotional, social, and psychological well-being; meanwhile, non-migrants had higher general trust in people compared to emigrants (Markšaitytė et al, 2017).

### 2.2.2.3. Returnees and those practicing return mobilities

Return migration to Lithuania has grown significantly since 2010, although declined somewhat in 2016-2017 (see Table 4). According to the official statistics, in total in 2014-2018 around 164 thousand of Lithuanian citizens registered their return, which is around

11 thousand per year. More than half of the returnees were young Lithuanians aged 19-34. In 2018, every second returnee (45,8%) came back from the UK. The number of migrants returning from the UK increased by one and a half times compared to 2017 (Statistics Lithuania, 2019b).

Table 4. Return migration to Lithuania, 2004-2018

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Total - in thousands	3,4	4,7	5,5	6,1	6,3	4,8	4,2	14	17,4	19	19,5	18,4	14,2	10,2	16,6
19-34-year-old returnees - in thousands	1,9	2,5	2,9	3,2	3,2	2,4	2,3	9	10,9	10,5	10,1	9	7,7	5,5	9,3
Share of 19-34-year-old returnees in total return migration	55%	54%	52%	52%	51%	49%	54%	64%	63%	55%	52%	49%	54%	54%	56%

Source: own elaboration based on Statistics Lithuania (2019c).

The official data shows only a partial picture because significant share of migration of Lithuanians has been short-term or undeclared (Žvalionytė, 2015). Nevertheless, based on recent surveys (2011, 2013) we can establish an indicative portrait of returnees. They tend to be relatively young (25-36 years old), lived abroad for 2-4 years and returned primarily because they wanted to reunite with the family and live in a familiar cultural environment. Willingness to raise children in the Lithuanian environment also stands out as one of the key reasons of return among those who moved abroad with children or became parent(s) while living abroad (Budginaitė & Mašidlauskaitė, 2015: 2016). Around one third of returnees came back from the UK, which is related to the fact that the UK is the most popular destination country (Barcevičius & Gineikytė, 2015). Many younger returnees engaged studying abroad or increased their human capital through professional activities, which contributed to their integration into the labour market (Barcevičius, 2016).

### 2.3. Studying life course through life trajectories and mobile transitions of young mobile Poles and Lithuanians

**Life course and life trajectories as a theoretical framework.** The concept of a life trajectory is an important element of life course theory. In the broadest sense it is “a sequence of life events and transitions” (Elder, 1985: 31). From a methodological point of view, it is impossible to determine what trajectory should look like, and research often focuses on transitions and through transitions says something about trajectories (Wingens et al.,

2011). However, it can be assumed that a trajectory is a sequence of states and phases in life as well as a sum of changes between states and phases of life.

In the project we focus on transitions at two level at least: on macro level as a political and social change (e.g. transition from communism to democracy in the case of Poland and Lithuania, transition from the EU member to country loosely cooperating with the EU in the case of the UK) and on micro level as a change in individual's biography. We treat migration as transitional phenomenon both on macro and micro level.

Based on life course approach a transition in biography means: "changes in state that are more or less abrupt" (Elder, 1985: 31). Transitions precede subsequent phases and stages. When analysing the data, transitions can be treated in two ways: (1) as single biographical changes in the course of life, e.g., change of employee's status to unemployed (Wingens et al., 2011) and (2) as a process extended over time, e.g., transition to motherhood. In the case of young migrants, we will observe various types of transitions, where the change of residential place itself will be transition as such. Above all, however, we deal with transitions from unemployment to employment, from education to work, and finally from youth to adulthood (King et al., 2016).

The multiplicity of migratory experiences among people entering the adulthood stage contribute to the creation of the concept of "mobile transitions" (Frändberg, 2013; Raffaetà et al., 2015; Robertson et al., 2017; King, 2017). This means that the key biographical changes of many young people take place "on the move" and involve both spatial and social mobility. These mobilities are involved to the education to work transition and responds to increased educational and professional aspiration. All these factors make biographical transitions of contemporary young people more complex, multidimensional and full of twists, and the trajectories themselves are discontinuous, non-linear and full of returns to the previous statuses (King, 2017) and less and less "standard" (Kohli, 2007; Elzinga & Liefbroer, 2007)<sup>3</sup>.

**Transitions into adulthood.** The transition into adulthood of contemporary young people relates to a stage and a phase in their life course (e.g.: Furlong & Cartmel; 2006; Sachmann & Wingens, 2001; Bynner, 2005; Côté & Bynner, 2008). This process has both internal and external dimensions relating to: (1) fulfilling the social roles as well as (2) looking for an own place in the world (Mary, 2013; Moroşanu et al., 2018). In the literature there is a division between "old" and "new markers" of transiting to adulthood. The old markers are understood primarily as the ones relating to fulfilling of specific social roles (taking a job, leaving home, or starting a family, for example Settersten, 2007; Buchmann & Kriesi, 2011). New markers are understood in more individualistic and intrapersonal categories, following the concept of Arnett's (2000) of "emerging adulthood". The concept of the emerging

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<sup>3</sup> Two concepts should be also mentioned here: the so called *yoyo transitions* as a term capturing the coming back to some previous state, e.g., coming back to education after its completion and some work episode or coming back to the family home after moving out and some episode of an independent living (Du Bois-Reymond & Lopez Blasco 2003). The second situation is defined by researchers by the metaphor of a "boomerang" (Mitchell, 2006; Kaplan, 2009; Berngruber 2015).

adulthood reflects experiences of searching for one's identity, as well as episodes of identity crises. It means the transition as developmental process from youth to adulthood:

Emerging adulthood is distinguished by relative independence from social roles and from normative expectations. Having left the dependency of childhood and adolescence, and having not yet entered the enduring responsibilities that are normative in adulthood, emerging adults often explore a variety of possible life directions in love, work, and worldviews. Emerging adulthood is a time of life when many different directions remain possible, when little about the future has been decided for certain, when the scope of independent exploration of life's possibilities is greater for most people than it will be at any other period of the life course (Arnett 2000: 469).

Being or not – an adult person is associated with an inner sense of maturity and readiness to make autonomous choices and decisions. Recently, this last concept of “internal adulthood” or “feeling an adult and acting an adult” have gained more attention in migration studies. As part of CEEYouth project we plan to understand changes through migratory lenses in the following areas: (1) leaving parental home, (2) graduation, (3) making the first professional choices, (4) entering into partner relationships, or (5) becoming a parent.

Particularly important for young Lithuanians and Poles is the fact that the enlargement of the European Union, after which we observed a huge wave of migration to the UK, took place in the context of macro-level transitions from the communist state to the democratic-liberal systems. Thus, a huge number of young migrants experienced mobile transitions in the time of political upheavals which makes youth transitions more uncertain (Kovacheva, 2001). The period of time between Brexit referendum and leaving the EU by the UK also can be treated as a transition on the macro level. It may magnify and complicate the process of transition(s) into adulthood of Polish and Lithuanian youth and makes it more risky.

**Mobile transitions.** Migration as such can be a kind of "rite of passage into adulthood" and cutting off the umbilical cord (Eade et al., 2006; King et al., 2016), or an attempt to leave the parents' shades (Moroşanu et al., 2018). Migration can also be a way to prolong youth by avoiding key educational and career decisions (Waters et al., 2011), and in less developed regions the only way to adulthood and independence (Horváth, 2008; Crivello, 2011; Punch, 2015).

In the context of entering adulthood, migration can be seen as an escape from the social pressure of the family to move away from parents or even the entire local community (Rutten & Verstappen, 2014; Jones, 1999; NiLaoire, 2010; Sarnowska 2019). What is more, parents may have an ambiguous attitude to their children's migration decisions, being against offspring's migration and offering financial support in the same time (Rutten & Verstappen, 2014). The escapist migration strategy is visible in the research on young migrants from rural areas, who feel suffocated in their local environments. Expectations towards/Pressures placed on young women are particularly strong (NiLaoire, 2010: 237, 240, see also Botterill, 2014). During early adulthood expectations of one's life, including the ideas of a place where he/ she wants to live are inconsistent. Migration

decisions of young adults are therefore difficult to predict, and the willingness to migrate does not preclude anchoring to the place of origin (Drozdewski, 2008).

Increased activity in moving abroad has its roots in destabilizing the clear path of life, where successive events leading to adulthood occurred in a chronological order (Axno et al., 2010; Krings et al., 2013). Migration can be the cause or response to discontinuous and difficult to predict the path of entering adulthood. This phenomenon also applies to young Poles and Lithuanians. Nowadays, young people in Poland and in Lithuania between adolescence and full adulthood experience a state of certain suspension, which may be caused by or be a consequence of migration. Regardless of the importance of migration for being or not – adults, it is worth noting that young people experience migration and mobility in different stages of the process of transition into adulthood.

### **Various forms of "growing up on the move"**

**Students' mobility.** Student mobility is related to travels under the Erasmus/ Socrates programs (so-called credit students), it also applies to people who complete their first and second cycle programs abroad (so-called degree students). According to King and Ruiz-Gelices (2003: 245-246), people who take some form of student mobility "set their individual life project on the move", which, as the authors argue, is an added value for later professional careers. Migrants-students come from other social strata than economic migrants (King & Ruiz-Gelices, 2003; King et al., 2016; Andrejuk, 2013; Waters et al., 2011; van Mol, 2014; Sadura, 2018). They usually come from the middle class of the country of origin and are often under social pressure of studying at a prestigious university (Waters et al., 2011). Researchers emphasize that the financial resources of the family of origin allow mobile students to postpone the beginning of adult life (Silva 2012) and focus on the accumulation of experience (e.g., Frändberg, 2013, see also Conradson & Latham, 2005; Favel, 2005). Students, especially from poorer countries than the country of education, despite the privileged position in the country of origin, often need to take up jobs to maintain themselves. However, they do not identify themselves as economic migrants (see Andrejuk, 2013). Research demonstrates that people are more likely study abroad if they had the previous experiences of traveling abroad and/ or foreign exchanges during education at primary or secondary levels (van Mol, 2014; see also Herbst et al., 2014).

**Low skilled and high skilled migration.** Polish and Lithuanian migrants in the UK are generally better educated than migrants from Poland and Lithuania in other EU countries (Grabowska-Lusińska & Okólski 2009; Statistics Lithuania, 2014) and population in their respective countries of origin. However, their education does not necessarily translate into transferrable skills and competencies needed to take up high-skilled positions in the UK. Among migrants with higher education there will be specialists and manual workers. In the case of the migrants from Central and Eastern Europe in the UK, the majority take up low-qualified jobs, which is often seen as a brain waste (see King et al., 2016). Moreover, employment below qualifications in the case of migrants from Central and Eastern Europe often does not lead to professional development (see Kaczmarczyk & Tyrowicz, 2015). This situation usually affects people who have difficulties in transferring their qualifications from the country of origin and/ or do not know English language well (e.g., Parutis, 2011).

The original intention of migration will determine professional aspirations and activity on labour market (see Parutis, 2011; see also Eade et al., 2006; Ryan, 2018; Trevena, 2013). People who move with the intention of staying for a short time often focus on accumulating economic capital, and therefore are willing to undertake “any job”, often below qualifications or not associated with the field of study taken in the country of origin. The temporary character of migration may be prolonged indefinitely (Blachnicka, 2008; Ryan et al. 2008; White & Ryan 2008; Ryan, 2015). Parutis (2011: 10) estimates that more or less after a year spending abroad, migrants begin to think about a “better job” and it may take them several years to reach their “dream job” if they invest in developing their skills and language fluency. Working below qualifications can be compensated by different lifestyle benefits such as the possibility of traveling and exploring the world (Trevena, 2013), which is the model of “middling transnationalism” (Conradson & Latham, 2005) implemented by young Europeans in Western Europe countries (Parutis, 2011; also Ryan, 2018). It is also worth adding that the work experience ‘unskilled jobs’ can be a turning point in a career and be capitalized after returning to the country of origin (Grabowska-Lusińska, 2012; Sarnowska 2016).

For people with low level of education, migration is often one way to escape the lack of opportunities on local labour market (Crivello 2011, Punch 2015), especially in communities with a strong migration culture (Horváth 2008, White 2010). In that case, migration plays an important role in supporting a quick transition to independent life (Silva 2013).

**Researching young migrants life longitudinally.** The final dimension that we plan to examine is to look at life trajectories from the lens of triggers and turning points. These are important events in the people’s biographies. Turning points can lead to a temporary or permanent change in attitudes, behaviours and thus change the course of the transition and trajectory (Abbot, 1997; Wingens et al. 2011; Neale, 2018)<sup>4</sup>. It is worth stressing, however, that the processing of the event’s effects in an individual’s life can be extended in time and empirically discernible only in the longitudinal perspective (Wingens et al. 2011; Neale, 2018). For young migrants, physical displacement as well as cultural exchange can be a turning point. Migration as such, as mentioned earlier, may also be the result of other turning point(s), such as conflict with parents. The Brexit referendum itself can be also trigger or a turning point for young migrants from Poland and Lithuania in the United Kingdom (e.g., Ryan, 2018).

#### **2.4. Social anchoring, differentiated embedding, acculturation**

One crucial theoretical conceptualization of the project refers to the social anchoring of young Poles and Lithuanians in the UK. The concept of social anchoring was developed by Grzymala-Kazłowska (2015) and defined as a process of determining meaningful anchors which provides successful adaptation to the new life settings (Grzymala-Kazłowska, 2017).

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<sup>4</sup> Elder (1998) wrote about a “developmental turning point, which means a change due to an biographical event and improvement of the situation of a disadvantaged person.

According to the definition of anchoring, individuals who face new circumstances and life conditions are searching for pivotal footholds which impact their feeling of security and stability (Grzymala-Kazłowska, 2017). In the CEEYouth project we assume that the stronger social anchoring in the UK (Grzymała-Kazłowska 2016), the stronger the will to remain. Nevertheless, the uncertainty linked to Brexit may impoverish 'intentional unpredictability' (Eade et al., 2006), leading to the potential regressions in the transitions of migrants and withdraw from reaching the markers of adulthood. Additionally, the extended state of 'deliberate indeterminacy' (Moriarty et al. 2010, McGhee et. al., 2017), may have negative impact on the level of migrants' psycho-social well-being.

Up until now, there have not been many references of anchors and anchoring in the sociological literature (e.g., Bauman 1997, Park 2007; Vertovec 2010; cited in: Grzymala-Kazłowska 2017). It appeared though in psychology and marketing as a predominantly cognitive construct (ibidem). The concept of social anchoring links the ideas that are popular in migration studies, such as the concepts of identity and integration as well as supplementing it with the adaptation processes (Grzymala-Kazłowska, 2017). It may even be treated as an alternative for the mentioned approaches. On one hand anchoring refers to the psychological aspects of migrants' well-being (e.g., the feeling of security) and on the other, to the substantial footholds. Moreover, the concept of anchoring directs attention on individuals' assets, exceeding the social network approach. Grzymala-Kazłowska (2017) distinguished two main groups of anchors: those which reflect the attachment to the home culture (e.g., eating habits or religious beliefs), and those which associates migrants with the host culture (e.g., willingness to advance the level of English, engaging in the local communities). The mechanism of anchoring bases on using old anchors and creating new ones. Finally, there might be different types of anchors: social, material, cognitive, cultural, or emotional etc. In the CEEYouth project we will examine the above mentioned groups and types of anchors that they establish and maintain in order to assess the extent to which young migrants from Poland and Lithuania are embedded in the UK.

It also refers to Engbersen et al. (2013) study typology of labour migration patterns among migrants from Central and Eastern Europe, based on two dimensions: attachment to the destination country and attachment to the country of origin. This typology identifies four migration patterns, namely: (i) **circular migrants** (mostly seasonal workers) with weak attachments to the country of destination, (ii) **bi-nationals** with strong attachments to both the home country and that of destination, (iii) **footloose/liquid migrants** with weak attachments to both the home and the destination country, and (iv) **settlers** with weak attachments to the home country. The findings demonstrated the relevance to the debate on transnationalism and integration of distinguishing different migration patterns.

The concept of social anchoring can be also supported by the concept of embedding, next to the attachment and belonging has become one of the emerging alternatives for the concept of identity. In contrast to the static term of embeddedness described in the work of Granovetter (cited in: Ryan, 2018), the concept of **differentiated embedding** has been defined as a dynamic process, which captures different levels of rootedness across distinct domains (ibidem). Therefore, it goes beyond simplified statements of being embedded or not, shifting towards the multi-dimensional forms of

embedding. Even though some migrants may for instance share the same job situation, their sense of belonging would be different: some of them would be embedding in the work sphere, while others would be embedding in different domains (ibidem). Although, our sample is quite homogenous in a sense that we are interested in young migrants, aged 19-34, from two European countries, we argue that they will not be embedding in the UK in the same exact way and across the same domains. On one hand, Polish and Lithuanians share similar socio-demographic profiles, also in terms of educational trajectories (post-communist countries) and migratory selectivity of young and formally highly educated people, on the other hand, they differ in terms of e.g., large Polish diaspora infrastructure in the UK and limited/ non-existent in the case of Lithuanians or issues around double citizenship: Lithuania only allows one citizenship.

Next to the search for pivotal footholds, the concept of social anchoring refers to psychological aspects of migrants' well-being: feeling of security and stability. One of the popular theories that reflect the level of migrants' satisfaction and dealing with the stress is acculturation. The concept of **acculturation** relates to the prolonged cross-cultural contact that causes changes in cultural behaviors and identities, leading to the differences in the level of well-being (Berry, 1980; Ward, 2001; cited in: Ward & Geeraert, 2016). Based on the participants' orientation toward host and home cultures, Berry (1980) proposed four strategies of acculturation, namely: integration, assimilation, separation and marginalization (cited in: Ward & Geeraert, 2016). Since then, research confirmed the systematic emergence of integration' and separation' strategies, however, the frequent occurrence of marginalization was not supported (Schwartz, Unger, Zamboanga, & Szapocznik, 2010; cited in: Ward & Geeraert, 2016). Young migrants from Poland and Lithuania might potentially have anchors related to the home and host country which would be reflected in the integration strategy of acculturation. The U-curve has been described in the early literature (e.g., Oberg, 1960) as a pattern establishing the occurrence of systematic negative feelings of people getting into intercultural transitions (cited in: Ward & Geeraert, 2016). More recently, it was proven (Demes & Geeraert, 2015) that recurring stress as a pattern is not a standard for everyone (cited in: Ward & Geeraert, 2016). The process of acculturation includes not only coping with stressors (strategies), but also acquisition and shift of cultural practices and values within ecological context (familial, institutional, societal; Ward & Geeraert, 2016). For instance, Tartakovsky (2012) proved that support from peers and teachers might have an impact on the positive demeanor toward the host country. The question remains to what extent our participants from Poland and Lithuania consider their peers as anchors. Research on acculturation has been criticized e.g., for the limiting one or bi-dimensional conceptualizations. Indeed, most of the studies on acculturation were of cross-sectional design and conducted on one cultural group in a single context (Ward & Geeraert, 2016). Fortunately, the new line of research emerged: it examines for instance the trajectories of cultural practices and values and linking them with social and psychological consequences (e.g., Knight, Basilio, Cham, Gonzales, Liu, Umaña-Taylor, 2014; Schwartz, Unger, Zamboanga, Córdova, Mason, Huang, 2015; cited in: Ward & Geeraert, 2016), which will also be discussed in the CEEYouth project.

To summarize, in the *CEEYouth* project we are planning to apply social anchoring concept, that refers to the ideas of searching for the migrant's anchors and to their feeling of psychological wellbeing. Accordingly, it indirectly relates to the concept of differentiated embedding described above, bringing extended perspective to the investigation of the situation of young migrants living in the contemporary UK. This is especially important if we take into account the uncertainty of Brexit and its consequences on the migrants' decisions to leave or to stay. Anchors may be compared to resources, which help to overcome emotionally difficult situations (Grzymała-Kazłowska, 2017). Nevertheless, some anchors might not be as adaptive as resources (*ibidem*). In the *CEEYouth* project we are going to distinguish anchors that build the feeling of stability and security as well as those which refrain from embedding, adaptation and acculturation. We will also explore the phenomenon of unanchoring which is reflected for instance in helping relatives to move to the UK or in applying for a new citizenship (Grzymała-Kazłowska, 2017) and a reverse embedding (dis-embedding) that may appear as a result of some negative events, like for instance a divorce (Ryan, 2018).

## **2.5. Social risks: migration in the risk society**

The final theoretical concept explored in the *CEEYouth* project is that of the broadly understood social risks. Quite clearly, this notion stems from Ulrich Beck's seminal work on risk society (2004), which underscored that modernity not only brought forward reiterated and emergent risks but is also a risk in itself (Beck, 1992). In the *CEEYouth* project, we argue that migration should be seen as one of the contemporary risks, while Brexit should be seen as a manufactured type of social risk. Drawing on Beck (2004) and Beck and Levy (2013), we propose to see Brexit not only as a manufactured but also multifaceted social risk, pointing to the finality of a transition from the first phase of a residual social risk, to the society which is "drifting in the sea of global risks" (Beck, 2004).

In the modern world, migration and Brexit exacerbate the condition in which individuals face tremendous difficulties when they seek to avoid risks. At the same time, risk is not evenly distributed in the society and migrants might be seen as a group typically more prone to various risks. Putting it bluntly, because of their generally lower social status and limited access to resources in Beck's terms (1992), the applications of risk theory to (labor/economic) migrants position them at a disadvantage, often with an additional ascription of vulnerability (see Williams, Balaz, 2012). However, an intersectional analysis points to the importance of social class and other socio-demographic traits that can either alleviate or exacerbate the risk-related burdens of an individual (see also Giddens 1999, Caplan 2000, Williams, Balaz 2012). Seeing risk as multiscalar and intersectional means that not all foreigners will experience risks universally because social class and ethnicity generate a matrix of risks with different strengths and origins.

Nevertheless, when juxtaposing migration with the stages of risk (Beck & Levy, 2013), one can argue that the United Kingdom of the 2004 was a welcoming society for CEE migrants. Conversely, since 2016 we have been witnessing the breakdown of the social and political institutions. It is worthwhile to think of the looming yet vague Brexit threat as sharing some similarities to the main type of risks that Beck theorized with the example of

climate change issues (2004). This is because - as recapitulated by Béland (2005), “citizens of contemporary societies exhibit acute risk awareness and, when new collective threats emerge, the logic of “organized irresponsibility” leads citizens and interest groups to blame elected officials for “bad news”. The notion of “organized irresponsibility” illuminates that people have difficulty understanding the process and simply say that “politicians” are actually responsible for Brexit and its ensuing consequences. However, as Brexit risks can no longer be attributed to specific and external agency, the observed society becomes a laboratory, in which no one in particular is responsible for the outcomes of social experiments (Beck, 1998: 14) and a pervasive feeling of being at risk becomes “the new normal”. As argued by Béland, actors - political and individual - can be proactive or reactive in the face of risks by including or excluding certain items or concerns from their agendas (2005).

Operationalizing Beck’s terms (1992, 2004) and applying risk to the context of the unfolding Brexit conditions witnessed and experienced by the young Polish and Lithuanian migrants in the United Kingdom, we propose to look at risk as an overarching and intersectional theoretical inspiration. In that sense, it does not suffice to say that modernity and migrancy are risk-conditions, as these are additionally overlain with the aforementioned aspect of social class (see also Curran, 2013) and - in the *CEEYouth* project - also with the issue of age. From this follows an intricate relationship between risk and youth. As the key focus of the project is on the situation of people aged 19 to 34, one must note that they constitute very mobile generational cohorts in both countries of origin. In addition, they are concurrently exposed to the particular risks linked to the era of globalization and a shift towards knowledge economy (Bendit 2008). Raised during the time of intensive and extensive social changes caused by technology, digitalization, and the mass-emergence of the Internet and social media’s pivotal importance for human life, youth are at the crossroads. This makes a determination of key competencies needed to navigate in the contemporary world a strenuous task and is heightened in the context of youth lacking a “voice” in social and political debates (Henn, Sharpe 2016).

Many multilayered risks begin in the development/labor nexus, stemming from the hailed end of prosperity era (financial crises), growing social inequalities, the uncertainty linked to the “end of work” pronouncement and widespread precarity (Arnold & Bongiovi, 2013). It must be reiterated that a paramount sense of risk did not suddenly appear after Brexit. In fact, that young migrants from both national groups have already faced significant risks in their respective countries of origin, which – at the key moment of youth departures – suffered from an overproduction of alumni (education leavers). Demographically, the cohorts examined in the *CEEYouth* project were the most vulnerable to the economic downfalls, marked by high unemployment rates (especially among youth), discrimination on the labour market, precarization (limited contracts, unpaid internships, work in the grey sectors), deskilling (Arnold & Bongiovi, 2013) as well as other social crises – for instance concerning housing situation or inflation of academic degrees (see also Beck, 2013; Kovacheva, 2001; Grabowska 2012; Sarnowska et al., 2018). In that sense, we can argue that CEE migrants should possess some personal or social expertise in what to do in the face of risk. The downside of this assumption is that the last time when social risks became too great, young CEE adults had the opportunity of going to the UK and living in a

relatively less “risky” context. It might very well be that some of those “at risk” will repeat this action and move again. However, further mobility may not be a viable risk-mitigating strategy for all in that some migrants have strong social anchors (e.g. their children’s schooling, properties, non-transferable social capital) in the UK.

In general, young people who experience political shifts as foreigners are exceptionally vulnerable to even more pronounced processes of growing social risks, commonly exacerbated by their hierarchically inferior positions with regard to social class and ethnicity (see e.g., Botterill, 2011; Williams, Balaz, 2012). Therefore, it is believed that young migrants from the two investigated groups experience risk in the British society in a highly ethnicized and politicized way. Therefore, it is observed that Brexit may signal an end of the “elective biographies” (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2011), which must now be strategically considered and crafted instead. Observing Polish and Lithuanian young migrants’ sense of belonging will determine the main arenas of emergent risks. With the help of social anchoring (Grzymała-Kazłowska, 2016, 2017) and differentiated embedding (Ryan, 2018; Ryan, Mulholland, 2015) as orienting concepts, CEEYouth fosters a capacity to delineate risk-mitigating strategies and behaviors across social (public and personal) lives.

It needs to be added that the 2016 Referendum marks the temporal caesura, yet the actual biographies and strategies of Polish and Lithuanians young migrants will be continuously diversified by an array of factors. Chief among them are a degree of formalization of one’s stay (residency, citizenship, vis-à-vis new arrivals), labor market trajectory (stability *versus* precarity), family situation (i.e. having already established own family of procreation), as well as access to the welfare state (social protections, healthcare) and education (King et al., 2016, 2017; Lulle et. al., 2017). It is assumed here that the actual timing and structural content (*soft/hard Brexit*) of Britain leaving the EU is of secondary importance to the individual choices and strategies, which are already shaped by the pervasive risk, regardless of its largely uncertain and unidentified nature (King et al., 2016). At the same time, the generation of 19 to 34-year-olds is demographically prone to certain life events connected to the broader process of transitioning to adulthood (Arnett, 2000; Sachmann & Wiggins, 2001; Bynner, 2005; Furlong & Cartmel; 2006; Settersten, 2007; Côté & Bynner, 2008; Buchmann & Kriesi, 2011; Mary, 2013). The frequently enumerated markers of becoming an adult from the perspective of the life-course research involve setting up one’s own household, starting a family of procreation (partnering/coupledness and procreation/having a child/children), and acquiring a permanent job position.

Consequently, we hypothesize and conduct investigations in the six main branches of risk-ridden realms. First of all, we will look at the (1) *institutional limbo* that people may experience as an external, macro-level force of pressures and uncertainty. These tensions are expected to have spillover effects in the networks - meaning migrants’ social circles not only abroad in the UK, but also as regards sedentary members of their families. Risk of status problematizations may engender new avenues of thinking about permanency/settlement versus return. Secondly, we examine another wide-spanning issue of “*no longer feeling at home*” (2). In this context, we begin from the top-level of treating property ownership and housing rights’ endangerment as a pivot to more individualized belonging and home-making processes observed at the level of daily practices. Thirdly, we situate risks in the (3) *eradication of social trust* in the institutions of state and welfare

system, as well as - possibly - reticence towards believing in the broader agendas proposed at the European or even global levels. Here the links to basic human rights and the aforementioned “organizational irresponsibility” (Beland 2005) can be drawn as migrants need to face uncertainty and potential ethnicization when accessing education, healthcare or welfare provisions. Next up, we look out for risks as a trigger for (4) *disturbances in human capital accumulation*, especially when it comes to disrupting compensatory trends in the post-communist societies. From a psycho-social stance, the CEEYouth research pays attention to (5) *worsened well-being*, hypothesizing that *self-esteem* might become a personal issue with political implications. We incorporate the existing research on well-being and mental health of migrants (e.g. Kouvonen et al. 2014) as a departure point for gauging the relationship between a sense of safety and risks, seen as psycho-social phenomena. Finally, for Lithuanians, we wonder what (6) a *legal risk of no-dual citizenship law* will mean for the strategies of young migrant cohorts who are confronted with the sudden change from the discourse of freedom and mobility to the hostility of the bordered regimes.

### 3. Objectives, research questions, hypotheses

In line with the literature review mentioned hereinabove, we formulated the following objectives, and corresponding research questions (see Table 5 below).

Table 5. Objectives and corresponding research questions

Objectives	Corresponding research questions
1. To carry out a detailed exploration of various risks young migrants from Poland and Lithuania experience in the context of Brexit;	What risks do migrants from Poland and Lithuania face in the context of Brexit?
2. To dynamically analyze how the unfolding consequences of Brexit affect life trajectories of Poles and Lithuanians, with special focus on transitions to adulthood;	How they react to risks? How structural conditions affect life-trajectories, with special focus on the transitions to adulthood?
3. To comparatively assess social anchoring of young Poles and Lithuanians in the UK;	What is social anchoring of young Poles and Lithuanians in the UK?
4. To compare migrating youth from Poland and Lithuania (movers) to the relevant sedentary populations in the sending countries (stayers);	What are the current considerations pertaining to return among young Poles and Lithuanians in the UK?
5. To explore and compare the latest return migration of the young Poles and Lithuanians;	What are the demographic and biographical portraits of young migrating (and returning) Poles and Lithuanians in the reference to the relevant sedentary populations?
6. To distil (if possible) migratory behaviors of mobile ethnic Poles from Lithuania and ethnic Lithuanians from Poland in the UK.	What are migratory careers of mobile ethnic Poles from Lithuania and ethnic Lithuanians from Poland in the UK in the context of Brexit (if possible, to be filtered out)?

Source: Own elaboration.

The research hypotheses were divided into categories of: (1) social anchoring; (2) risks and (3) strategies (see Table 6 below).

Table 6. Hypotheses divided into three categories

Category of research hypotheses	of Knowledge-based hypothesis
(1) Social anchoring (Grzymała-Kazłowska, 2016)	The higher degree of <b>embeddedness and social anchoring in the UK</b> (Grzymała-Kazłowska, 2016), the stronger the will to remain. This might include making decisions for a prolonged state of deliberate indeterminacy (Moriarty et al. 2010, McGhee et. al., 2017), in spite of its potentially negative influence on the psycho-social wellbeing. The pervasive uncertainty tied to Brexit will exacerbate intentional unpredictability (Eade et al., 2006), thus propelling migrants to cease a pursuit of achieving the markers of adulthood, or yielding reversals and regressions in their transitions.
(2) Risks (Beck, 2004)	<b>The CEEYouth project assumes social risks (Beck, 2004) connected to the unfolding Brexit conditions:</b> (1) putting people in institutional limbo might bring uncertainty and tensions which might have a spill over effect from individuals to the sedentary members of families; (2) property rights might be endangered and remove the sense of feeling and home; (3) the trust in education, healthcare and social welfare systems supplying basic human needs might be endangered; (4) the process of human capital accumulation (crucial compensation for post-communist societies) might be disturbed; (5) self-esteem might be decreased; (6) shutting the door to come back to the country of origin for those Lithuanians who take the British citizenship.
(3) Strategies (Grabowska-Lusińska & Okólski, 2009)	Young migrants take on <b>institutional actions</b> , e.g., by submitting applications for <b>residential status and/or citizenship</b> ; social participation and political engagement will surge. a) Migrants will strengthen their efforts in the <b>economic sphere</b> , for instance by devising and implementing strategies to avoid the situation of “drifting” on the labour market. b) Migrants will seek to improve their <b>competences</b> , specifically in connection with the level of English language skills, as well as by attempting to formalize their newly acquired qualifications. c) Young migrants will take on actions in their <b>private/intimate/family life</b> , for instance with respect to formalizing mixed partnerships. d) Migrants will act in the area of free <b>mobility</b> , some may attempt a return migration, while others will consider migrating to another country, different than the country of origin.

Source: Own elaboration.

#### 4. Methodology: mixed-method research (MMR)

The CEEYouth project implements the mixed-method research (MMR) approach, based on the integrative logic (Mason, 2006). Each element of the project is closely linked with the research objectives and hypotheses (Creswell, 2009). The project is consistent with the main assumption of MMR, which states that there is a need for diversified data, collected through different repertoire of methods in order to compensate the weaknesses and strengthen the advantages of each tool (Johnson & Turner, 2003; Brewer & Hunter,

2006:4). When data from various sources are compatible, the credibility of one result increases (Small, 2011:61). Thus, the analysis of quantitative statistical data allows us to map the situation of Polish and Lithuanian migrants in terms of their age structure, situation on the labour market and plans regarding stay/return. Qualitative component will shed a light on their transitions, on the experienced risks and on the coping strategies. Both sets of data will be utilized to prepare a web-survey.

## Methodology: Mixed-method




Figure 3. Visualisation of MMR in the CEEYouth project

Source: Own elaboration.

### 4.1. Qualitative component

Qualitative part of this project is based on the innovative methodology combining qualitative longitudinal study (QLS) (Neale, 2018; Saldana, 2003) with asynchronous interviews. It consists of the ongoing and targeted exchanges between the researcher and the participant (Ratislavová & Ratislav, 2014), under the premise of walking alongside the research participant in the “live” and extended format (Neale & Flowerdew, 2003). In this longitudinal plan, three types of interviews will be conducted with each research participant: an intake interview, asynchronous interviews and regular, in-depths interview in order to see, how unfolding Brexit affects life trajectories of Poles and Lithuanians, with special focus on transitions to adulthood. There are several rationales behind this research plan. First, asynchronous interviews, being logistically easy to organize and conduct, will allow us to react on the changes in the political situation connected with Brexit, secondly, we will be able to get more reflective, structured responses. Combining those with “classic” face to face interviews will permit us to obtain more in-depth data and to avoid certain risks connected with asynchronous interviewing such as establishing trust relation or keeping participants engaged in the project. ,

### Timeline of synchronous and asynchronous interviewing (24 months)




Figure 4. Synchronous and asynchronous interviewing in the period of 24 months.

Source: Own elaboration.

#### 4.1.1. Intake interview

CEEYouth project is focused on post-accession migrants, i.e. those who arrived to the UK after 2004. Eligible participants should be living in the UK for at least three years (counting approximately from February-March 2019). The participants will be recruited using a mix of purposeful sampling and convenience sampling in order to obtain a reasonable heterogeneity within Polish and Lithuanian samples, as well as to keep these samples comparable.

Intake interviews are classic, synchronous, semi-structured interviews conducted either face to face or via Skype (or another similar tool). The main goals of the intake interviews are 1) to gain a general overview of the interviewee's life situation, his/her social anchors in the UK (and social anchors in the home country) and perceived risks and plans, as well as key socio-demographic data, which is crucial for planning subsequent waves of interactions (asynchronous exchanges and IDIs), 2) to understand participants' opinions and experiences connected with Brexit and in the context of general uncertainty regarding its actual consequences for EU citizens in the UK, 3) to establish a trusting relationship and make participants involved in the project.

#### 4.1.2. Asynchronous interviewing

An asynchronous interview takes place when a researcher and an interviewee are not on line at the same time, i.e. it is conducted in non-real time (O'Connor et al., 2008; Ratislavová & Ratislav, 2014). Most often, they are conducted via e-mail, but other media are also accepted. Typically, an asynchronous interview lasts several weeks and entails several exchanges between a researcher and a participant (Fritz & Vandermause, 2018). The time between the exchanges should not be too long to minimize the risk of respondents dropping out.

The difference between real time v. non-real time exchanges means that in case of synchronous interviews we receive spontaneous responses, whereas during asynchronous interviews participants have the opportunity to reflect on the questions and reply at their own convenience (for details on the difference about them see for example:

O'Connor et al., 2008; James & Busher, 2012; 2016). Using both techniques in CEEYouth, we will be able to combine these two data sets and get a more nuanced picture.

The main goal of the asynchronous interviews in CEEYouth project is to gain more data regarding anchors, transitions and risks (it should be continuation and development of the intake) as well as **to grasp their unfolding live trajectories** in the UK after EU enlargement in May 2004 and in the context of Brexit. As the idea of longitudinal study is to track changes in interviewees' lives, each exchange should begin with a question regarding the changes since the last interview.

The number of questions in one message will be limited to 2-3 in order not to overwhelm respondents. The questions will be included in the body of the email/message, rather than in an attachment. The questions will be numbered and self-explanatory, since there is very little room for clarification. Suggested time for participants to answer is one week, then a remainder may be sent. However, to respect voluntary character of the participation and interviewees' right to withdraw at any moment, the number of remainders should not exceed 2-3 (see e.g. Meho, 2006; Fritz and Vandermause, 2018). Throughout the course of the asynchronous interviewing during 24 months we will put Brexit into the context of other structural events as highlighted in the introduction.

#### **4.1.3. In-depth interview (IDI) – synchronous interviews**

The main goal of the IDIs is to supplement data collected during the intake interview and asynchronous exchange with a more detailed and in-depth perspective. IDIs last approximately 1,5-2 hours, they are loosely structured, non-directive research method permitting to get a nuanced perspective on the themes mentioned before by interviewees as problematic or particularly important (Kvale, 2007). The important goal of the IDIs is to get a picture of emotions, coping strategies and well-being of participants in the process of adaptation to the life in the UK. IDI is the most in-depth method used in the project, so it should touch upon the most intangible issues, requiring self-reflection and difficult to write in a synthetic way, such as how a person changed in the process of migration, how migration was/is connected to the turning points in one's biography, what may be the balance of one's life abroad etc.

#### **4.1.4. Managing data**

As during the project participants are requested to share personal data, research team is obliged to guarantee data protection and confidentiality, following Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. To fulfil these obligations, recruitment of participants was conducted on voluntary basis with potential participants responding to recruitment messages in social networks, websites of both partner institutions. Before interviewing, all respondents are asked to fill in consent forms to confirm they are acquainted with the aims and process of the project, as well as they understand their rights to refuse provide answers or to end their participation at any stage of the project. Consent forms are collected through electronic survey tool "Survey Gizmo", which is administered to this end by PPMI. All consent forms are sent through safe encoded Secure Sockets Layer, ensuring the same level of security as internet banks.

The collection of data is conducted with the help of communication channels, approved by Research Ethic Board. All data gathered during the project (including personal data and contact information) will be stored either in PPMI server, which grants data protection and confidentiality under Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 or on external hard disks secured with a password. Only the researchers working on CEEYouth project have access to the recordings of the interviews, answers sent via Internet and personal information. In the published journals, other academic works and conferences, first and last name of the respondents, as well as any other information that could reveal their identity will be changed. All team members follow ethical standards and protect confidential information.

## 4.2. Quantitative component

### 4.2.1. Secondary data analysis & research overview

Secondary data analysis will be used to complete objective 4: to compare migrating youth from Poland and Lithuania (movers) to the relevant sedentary populations in the sending countries (stayers). The key sociodemographic characteristics to be analysed include age, gender, education, and employment. Whenever possible, comparisons will be drawn between 19-34 year-old Lithuanian and Polish migrants, as well as equivalent populations in their countries of birth.

Cross-national comparisons come with a set of challenges. Most notably, the data are not always comparable. Although both Lithuania and Poland carry out Labour Force Surveys (LFS), the Polish version of the LFS includes a separate module on migrants, whereas no equivalent data collection exercise is carried out in Lithuania<sup>5</sup>. In Polish LFS' survey, a participant is requested for the basic information (f.e. gender, country of residence) of household's members who have been abroad for minimum three months (before 2006, minimum two months). However, the participant of Polish LFS might dissimulate the fact of having the migrant in the household due to different reasons. If the whole household has migrated, there is no one to enter the research, and the household is not included in the results. Therefore the sample of Polish migrants in LFS is small and underreported (Statistics Poland, 2018c, p. 31) As a result if it, the LFS data about Polish migrants is not publicly-available, and Statistics Poland uses it as auxiliary data for estimation of the number of Polish inhabitants living temporarily abroad (see: 2.2.1.1).

Statistics on Lithuanian international migration are based on declarations of the place of residency, the registry of foreigners who come to live in Lithuania, and census data<sup>6</sup>. Given the different sources of information on migrants, it would be difficult to draw direct comparisons between Lithuanian and Polish migrants using national statistics of each country.

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<sup>5</sup> Personal communication with Statistics Lithuania, 2018-10-16.

<sup>6</sup> Statistics Lithuania, "Gyventojų tarptautinės migracijos statistinio tyrimo metodika", paragraph 15, November 29, 2017. Available from:  
[https://osp.stat.gov.lt/documents/10180/576507/Tarp\\_migr\\_metod.pdf](https://osp.stat.gov.lt/documents/10180/576507/Tarp_migr_metod.pdf)

To overcome this challenge, the research team will use the British LFS as the primary source of information on both Lithuanian and Polish migrants. In the British LFS, Poles and Lithuanians living in the UK are surveyed using the same methodology, making statistics comparable. Furthermore, the data are publicly available and includes a rich set of variables that are of interest to our analysis.

Nevertheless, the British LFS also presents some disadvantages for the purposes of fulfilling objective 4. For our study, it would be relevant to compare key socio-demographic characteristics of Lithuanian and Polish migrants from 2004 until the latest year of data available. Labour force surveys are designed to track incremental changes related to people's employment. Therefore, the survey is administered on a quarterly rather than annual basis, with waves of the same respondents interviewed every quarter. This methodology allows statisticians to precisely tell how employment patterns are changing because they are comparing the same people over the course of the year. This methodology, however, also results in the duplication of the same respondents, making the survey no longer representative if quarterly datasets are joined to make one annual dataset. Therefore, adjustments to the quarterly LFS datasets need to be made to maintain representativeness for the purposes of our research.

To overcome the issue of representativeness in each year, the research team considered using the Annual Population Survey (APS). The APS is designed by taking non-duplicate LFS responses and adding boost samples, making the survey representative for the whole year. The publicly-available version of the APS, however, does not include a variable to identify Lithuanians because the UK Data Service has an obligation to ensure respondents' confidentiality. While the secured access version does, scholars from outside the UK cannot gain secure access without a sponsoring UK organisation. Therefore, the research team will use the APS as a supplementary source of data on Polish migrants only. Drawing from the LFS, the UK Data Service also produces 5-quarter datasets that do not involve duplicate respondents. Similarly as with the APS, however, the publicly available versions lack country of birth or nationality variables needed to identify Lithuanians.

As a result, the main source of data for our analysis will be quarterly LFS datasets from the first quarter (January-March) of each year from 2004 until 2017. To eliminate duplicate responses, we will keep only respondents interviewed in waves 1 through 4. With this approach, statistics will be representative of the selected quarter. Furthermore, we will not report absolute numbers of Lithuanian or Polish migrants living in the UK from the LFS, but we will use aggregate Office for National Statistics numbers for that purpose<sup>7</sup>. The LFS will allow us to showcase migrants' key socio-demographic characteristics (age, gender, education, and employment) for years 2004-2017. Note that the 2018 British LFS lacks information to identify Lithuanians, so it will not be included in the analysis. Once we have calculated statistics on Polish and Lithuanian migrants in the UK, we will compare them with equivalent populations in their countries of birth.

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<sup>7</sup> For example, see table 1.3 from the ONS,

<https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/datasets/populationoftheunitedkingdombycountryofbirthandnationality>.

For the comparison with non-migrant Lithuanians, we will draw from the publicly-available Lithuanian LFS<sup>8</sup>. Note that the publicly-available LFS in Lithuania does not include information prior to 2011 and the age variable available in the datasets is grouped in 5-year intervals. Therefore, the comparison will be drawn between 19-34 year-old Lithuanian migrants in the UK and 20-35 year-old Lithuanian citizens residing in Lithuania. The publicly-available versions of the LFS have sufficient information to draw comparisons based on key sociodemographic variables.

For the comparison with non-migrant Poles, we will use the publicly-available Polish LFS for years 2004-2018. For Poland, the comparison will be drawn between 19-34-year-old Polish movers in the UK and 18-34-year-old stayers (because the age variable available in the Polish datasets has age group 18-19 as a whole). The publicly-available versions of Polish LFS will allow us to draw comparisons between movers and stayers based on age group, gender and economic activity.

#### 4.2.2. Web survey (CAWI)

The quantitative component of the project will be carried out by using Computer Assisted Web Interview (CAWI) (Couper et. al., 2001). It was designed to measure strategies of young migrants in response to post-Referendum discussion. The chosen approach to the study design was based on the so-called convergence-explanation MMR strategy, where each method brings individual information that might be combined for an analysis (convergence), and they are mutually informative (explanation) at the same time. Following this logic, the data collected during intake and asynchronous interviews will be used to improve and redesign the web survey. In the present project, MMR bases on the component composite design (Greene & Caracelli, 1997), leading to the balance between qualitative and quantitative elements (Creswell, 2009; Mason, 2006).

##### 4.2.2.1. Participants/respondents & procedure

We are planning to carry out the survey using convenience sampling with a minimum of 600 migrants who are living or have lived in the UK: 300 migrants from Poland and from Lithuania (including 50-100 returnees per country). The survey will focus on the young migrants (19-34).

The respondents will be recruited via social media (Facebook, LinkedIn, Instagram) and other channels. The research team will cooperate with and/ or post information on websites that target migrants or returnees. These can be both general news sites as well as specialised platforms aimed to address the needs of their target audience (powroty.gov.pl; [www.renkuosilietuva.lt](http://www.renkuosilietuva.lt)). There will be some incentives to motivate respondents to participate in the survey, for example a draw to win vouchers for a bookshop.

<sup>8</sup> [https://osp.stat.gov.lt/viesos-duomenu-rinkmenos/-/asset\\_publisher/i2LnhXkrXAbl/content/ketvirtinio-gyventojuuzimtumostatistiniotyrimo?inheritRedirect=false&redirect=https%3A%2F%2Fosp.stat.gov.lt%2Fviesosduomenurinkmenos%3Fp\\_p\\_id%3D101\\_INSTANCE\\_i2LnhXkrXAbl%26p\\_p\\_lifecycle%3D0%26p\\_p\\_state%3Dnormal%26p\\_p\\_mode%3Dview%26p\\_p\\_col\\_id%3Dcolumn-1%26p\\_p\\_col\\_pos%3D1%26p\\_p\\_col\\_count%3D2](https://osp.stat.gov.lt/viesos-duomenu-rinkmenos/-/asset_publisher/i2LnhXkrXAbl/content/ketvirtinio-gyventojuuzimtumostatistiniotyrimo?inheritRedirect=false&redirect=https%3A%2F%2Fosp.stat.gov.lt%2Fviesosduomenurinkmenos%3Fp_p_id%3D101_INSTANCE_i2LnhXkrXAbl%26p_p_lifecycle%3D0%26p_p_state%3Dnormal%26p_p_mode%3Dview%26p_p_col_id%3Dcolumn-1%26p_p_col_pos%3D1%26p_p_col_count%3D2)

#### 4.2.2.2. Survey design. Description of the tool

The survey will be carried out using unique links meaning that each respondent will receive a personally-generated link, which allows for a certain level of verification of respondents' identity (e.g., you can check the IP address, location; you can send reminders to a specific respondent in the case she or he did not complete the survey). Given that the rate of response to web-based surveys is around 15-25 per cent, we estimate that we will need to send out at least 2000 - 2500 links for Lithuania and 2000 - 2500 links for Poland in order to achieve the target response number.

In order to ensure certain variety within the sample, the research team will construct quotas based on gender (M/F) and age (19-24; 25-29; 30-34). Further, around 225 respondents per country will be currently living in the UK while around 75 will be returnees who have returned in 2016-2019.

The survey will be carried out using the Survey Gizmo tool that provides all the necessary functionalities for a professional survey (question types, ability to carry out the same survey in several languages). The first version of the survey questionnaire will be prepared in English to ensure coordination between the Polish and Lithuanian teams. This version will be tested extensively (including several pilot tests with migrants). After the testing is completed, the research team will translate the survey into Polish and Lithuanian and kick-start the survey.

Given the nature of web-based surveys, the questionnaire will have to be relatively short, up to 30 questions that can be answered in 15 minutes. The questions will cover: a) key reasons for coming into the UK; b) the main economic, social and civic anchors (e.g., permanent employment, property, citizenships); c) how does the Brexit feels (e.g., does the respondent feels more or less valued in the workplace; does the respondent feeling of well-being increased or decreased since the Referendum; does Brexit made it more or less difficult to receive public services); and d) personal reaction to Brexit (rooting itself more deeply into the British society vs. un-anchoring or avoiding anchoring).

The responses received will be cleaned and verified using appropriate statistical procedures. The answers will be analysed and compared across groups and countries. Then the survey data will be brought together with the evidence coming from all the other methods and will be used by the study team to respond to the study questions.

## 5. Concluding remarks

The unique selling points of the *CEEYouth* research project on comparing young Polish and Lithuanian migrants in the context of the structural events such as Brexit relate to the following aspects.

1. Up until now due to the geographical proximity and being in the same EU accession group of countries, Poles and Lithuanians, were merged into the same category of migrants and therefore sending societies. In this project we would like to investigate the differences next to the similarities, not the other way round. This will bring us to juxtapose Brexit with the process of the EU enlargement in 2004.

2. We would also examine if coming from the similar European region, but having different positionalities in the past in relation to the Soviet Union (Lithuania was a part of it; Poland was a satellite country) and therefore not the same processes of the system transformations impact on the life courses and transitions to adulthood of the following mobile generations. This will bring us to juxtapose Brexit with the communist breakdowns and its consequences.
3. The project aims also to look at the sending populations and their migrants not in terms of the scale and absolute numbers (of course Poland is much bigger population) but also in terms of the relational share of mobile people referenced to the size of the societies and therefore the commonality of geographical and return mobilities in them.
4. The international cooperation and funding of the *CEEYouth* project allow us to guarantee both the scale (socio-demographic structure of migrants and return migrants) and the depth (life trajectories and strategies, transitions to adulthood) of research and the analyses in the comparative perspective. This will be possible both thanks to the latest datasets of Labour Force Survey from various sides: Polish, Lithuanian and British but also novel methodology in migration studies of combining synchronous with asynchronous interviewing.
5. We position the *CEEYouth* project in the contemporary social sciences that matter and therefore we take the risk to study societal challenges which happen with a higher speed than social sciences are able to conceptualise them. It entails a thematic focus on young Polish and Lithuanian migrants in light of Brexit while aiming at theoretical and methodological openness and complexity. It leads to the presented mix-method approach and mixed research funding and will also lead to a mixed publication strategy addressing both international peer-review journals but also communicating with Polish and Lithuanian audiences.

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
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*Appendix 1. Brexit in the context of selected other structural events of the last three decades that may impact upon individual life trajectories. The indicative graph that will be adapted for Lithuanian and Polish respondents.*

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#### **Redaktor (*Editor-in-Chief*)**

dr Agata Jastrzębowska-Tyczkowska  
[ajastrzebowska@swps.edu.pl](mailto:ajastrzebowska@swps.edu.pl)