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**A NEW PERIOD OF THE MUTUAL RAPPROCHEMENT  
OF WESTERN AND CHINESE CIVILISATIONS:  
TOWARDS A COMMON APPRECIATION OF HARMONY  
AND CO-OPERATION**

**ABSTRACT**

Since the 1990's the rise of China provokes heated debates in the West. Numerous politicians and scholars, who study contemporary political affairs, pose the question, which will be the new role of China in international affairs? Many Western observers presume that China will act as the Western powers did in the past, promoting policy of domination, enslavement and gaining profits at all costs. The Chinese declarations on peace, co-operation, mutual interests, and harmony are often considered empty words, a certain *decorum* of "real politics", as it had been often practised in the West. An inquiry into the Chinese political and intellectual traditions, almost unknown in the West, challenges such widespread opinions and fears. Of course, it is an open question to which degree the traditional Chinese concepts will determine contemporary policy, since China had been westernised in enormous degree.

Nevertheless, attitude to war, struggle, and competition constitutes one of the principal characteristics of each culture and appears closely related to its structure of values. Such attitudes determine political concepts and systems, foreign relations, norms of social life, etc. The analysis of Western and Chinese civilisations demonstrates that in this respect they represented divergent orientations. In Erich Fromm's typology of societies, the Chinese culture could be considered *non-destructive but aggressive*, whereas Western civilisation could be called *aggressive and destructive*.

Of course, there were great differences both within Chinese and within Western civilisations. Local/regional cultures belonging to each of them had their own characteristics in respect to struggle, and one could also notice great changes in the course of their histories. In general, at the dawn of these two civilisations, both of them were more or less bellicose, although in the cultures of the Chinese Central Plain "avoiding struggle" traits could be detected quite early. Appreciation of peace and harmony eventually prevailed with the predomination of the Confucian ideology, although Taoism and other schools of thought also condemned struggle and war. On the other hand, in the Mediter-

reanean the bellicose cultures and war-mongering states prevailed. The beginning of this “great divergence” could approximately be dated for the middle of the 1st millennium BC, and the civilisations of East Asia and Europe took the opposite courses in their social and political development. Struggle constituted a fundamental principle in the Western vision of the world-order, and its crucial archetype constituted the eternal struggle of Evil against Good, with the eventual triumph of God, who embodies Good and forces of Light. The Chinese tradition promoted instead the vision of the universe as one giant organism based on the principle of harmony, where Yin complements Yang. Hence both civilisations adopted the dualistic concepts, but one was antagonistic, and the second—complementary.

In the 19th century, when Asian nations faced the colonial conquests, many of them tried to protect their independence and modernise themselves. For this end they tried to adopt not only Western armaments and military skills, but also Western bellicose ideology and values. Japan was obviously the champion of such a militarist course, but there were similar tendencies in China as well. Such bellicose ideology reached its apex there during the famous Maoist Cultural Revolution, when class struggle and bellicosity was exalted. The triumph of the Western bellicose approach and rejection of the traditional native heritage marked the century 1860’s–1960’s in China.

However, after the unimaginable sufferings of the World War I and II, of Nazism and of communism, the West started to revalidate its traditions condemning war and violence. People started to appreciate peace and co-operation within and among nations. The United Nations and the European Union had been founded for such purposes: to promote peace and co-operation. However, the condemnation of wars did not halt military confrontation of the states, and the West still cultivates political ideologies, which propagate the “proper order” based on competition and struggle. Hence the concepts of multi-party democracy and of free market could serve as hallmarks of the West.

In China, since the end of the 1970’s step by step the ancient ideological traditions have been appreciated again and the new concepts of peaceful and harmonious development evolved. At the beginning of the 21st century the Chinese leaders elaborated a new ideology of both harmonious domestic and international order aiming at peaceful development based on co-operation. Of course, there are still vivid the remnants of the previous Western-type approach of the brutal competition and of aggressive foreign policy.

Notwithstanding divergent tendencies inside each of these civilisations, in general they both approach each other again, but this time in a common search for peace, co-operation and harmonious development. Their interpretations obviously differ, since in China such concepts are traditional, but rather new in the West, and in various respects both sides have different values and ideals.

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Since the 1990’s peaceful rise of China provoked heated discussions in the West. Politicians and scholars, who study contemporary political affairs, pose the question, which will be the new role of China in international affairs, and

what will be her policy? Numerous observers presume that China would inevitably carry out an aggressive policy of domination trying to subordinate weaker nations and gain one-sided profits, whereas other experts underline her specific traditions and the key role of the “soft power” in the present policy or as a certain tendency. These controversies had been related to another question: which policy to China should adopt the United States and Europe?<sup>1</sup> The fears of an aggressive China’s policy are diffused in the West, since this policy was considered there “normal” for great powers since the ancient times. There were, of course, great thinkers, who promoted the ideas of peace and harmonious cooperation, as Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). The followers of ancient Pythagoras (ca 580–500 BC) adopted the vision of the universe based on the principle of harmony, etc. However, the militaristic traditions and tendencies to subdue other political subjects predominated there since the middle of the 1st millennium BC.

Under such circumstances, numerous Western observers presumed that the Chinese declarations on peace and harmony are merely empty words, a certain *decorum* of real power politics. In this contemporary context the discussion on the Chinese political and intellectual traditions, almost unknown in the West, acquire particular significance. In order to co-operate together in one global world we should know and understand the great patterns of history and specific dynamics of various civilisations

### 1. WESTERN CIVILISATION—UNIVERSAL OR “REGIONAL”?

Since the Middle Ages the Europeans usually presumed that their concepts, values, categories, etc are *universal*, since they were rooted in Christianity, which was considered universal. In the modern period the enlarged “West”, which included America, Australia, and New Zealand, dominated the world. The Westerners believed that The West constitutes the core of the mankind according to the scheme “The West—and the rest”, although the contemporary realities change in a dramatic way.<sup>2</sup> However, the majority of the Westerners are still convinced that they elaborated the universal Civilisation, which had to be merely absorbed by the Arabs, the Africans or the Chinese. In the colonial period they maintained that the diffusion of this Civilisation constitutes their “mission” and this justified even the most brutal oppression of non-Western peoples, the colonial exploitation and even mass murder of the “aborigines” in America and Australia. Until today the Westerners are not used yet to perceive themselves, as representing one specific Western civilisation, rooted in Mediter-

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<sup>1</sup> For the first approach see: A. L. Friedberg, 2011; for the second: H. Kissinger, 2011. For their review see: A. J. Nathan, 2011. See also: Ch. Glaser, 2011; T. J. Christiansen, 2011, and D. A. Bell, 2008a.

<sup>2</sup> For an analysis of these concepts and their basis see, for instance, N. Ferguson, 2011; I. Morris, 2010; R. Scruton, 2002.

raean heritage and Christianity, similar in this respect to the Chinese or Islamic civilisations. The majority of the Westerners still are convinced that they possess and represent the universal norms and values, which should be imposed on other nations.

Such beliefs are not groundless: they are rooted in the modern history and even substantiated to a certain extent not only by the Western domination in the past, but by contemporary realities as well. Moreover, a significant part of intellectual and political elite in non-Western states still accepts such concepts, since it was educated in the Western-type schools and all its interests are related to the western domination in the world. One could merely state that today such an approach is contested with an increasing frequency and fervour.<sup>3</sup> The number and significance of various “nativist” concepts increase and their supporters demand more openly their rights to cultivate their own cultural traditions, values, ways of life, and even the right to maintain their political systems adapted to their own traditions and realities. In addition to the Hollywood movie industry and celebrities there appeared the Bollywood centre producing Indian movies for a wide Asian audience, and there are growing the Chinese and African centres. Entirely new situation evolves with the rise of China and the discussions, truly frustrating for the Westerners, whether China becomes the next superpower and when it will happen?<sup>4</sup> The most significant, perhaps, in the 1990’s were heated debates on “Asian values”, which for the first time confronted the Westerners with the promoters and defenders of other cultural traditions.<sup>5</sup>

Samuel P. Huntington rightly warned the American ruling elite, that its values and concepts must not be imposed on the peoples of other civilisations, since it may provoke a “clash of civilisations”. Unfortunately, notwithstanding the wide diffusion of his book, his concepts were very often misinterpreted. Even the adoption by the UN in 1998 the concept of “dialogue among cultures and civilisations” did not prevent increasing tension between the Christian West and non-western countries, first of all the Islamic world. George W. Bush’s “war against terror” further increased a true hatred towards the West.<sup>6</sup> It appears that we live now in a transitory period, when the domination of the West diminishes day by day in all respects, which includes the domination of Western culture, whereas new regional centres of non-western cultures evolve and a new polycentric global architecture is shaped. Numerous scholars and politicians analyse and present such new trends from various perspectives.

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<sup>3</sup> See, for instance, Mahathir Mohamad, Shintaro Ishihara, 1995; Mahathir Mohamad, 1999; Yan Xuetong, 200; Kishihore Mahbubani, 2008; Yun Shan, 2011.

<sup>4</sup> See, for instance: G. Murray, 1998; M. Jacques, 2009; N. Birdsall, F. Fukuyama, 2011.

<sup>5</sup> For the best and concise presentation of this concept see; Mahathir bin Mohamad, 1996. See also the collections of studies, which present various opinions: J. R. Bauer, D. A. Bell, eds., 1999; L. Diamond, M. F. Plattner, eds., 1998.

<sup>6</sup> The roots of such attitudes analyses M. Pearse, 2004.

In order to understand better the contemporary affairs, it would be useful to look back to history. Until the industrial and scientific revolution, and the triumph of capitalism Western civilisation was, undoubtedly, merely “regional”. The situation changed when the Western powers created the colonial system and dominated the world convinced that they represent progress and the only true Civilisation. As Prasenjit Duara pointed out, in the 19th century, at the height of European imperial power, the Westerners believed that there is only one Civilisation, i.e. European, based originally on Christian and Enlightenment values and it was presumed to be universal. They justified their conquests of other continents as a civilising mission. In their opinion, to be a nation was to belong to a higher, authorising order of civilisation. From the unequal treaties signed by western powers one could conclude that Civilisation referred first of all to the ability, or at least of *willingness* of the states to protect rights to life, property and freedoms (particularly for foreigners). A nation to be considered “civilised” should possess the institutions of a modern European state, its goals, and values. No less important were “civilised practices” ranging from the pursuit of material progress to manners and clothing. Duara also indicates that each civilisation concerns the definition of self versus Other at a macrosocietal level (Duara, Prasenjit, 2002, 79–81). So, the Westerners considered themselves as representing “civilised human beings”, and all their particular cultural characteristics, their aspirations, standards, norms, and values have been treated by them “universal”, proper to Man.

Hence in order to be considered “civilised” the elite in numerous Asian and African countries adopted various Western institutions, customs, and even Christianity, and this situation, in the opinion of the Westerners, confirmed that their Civilisation is truly universal. To some extent such westernization could be spontaneous and sincere, but it could also be purposeful, carried out by individual Asians and Africans to acquire prestige of a “civilised person” and to enjoy confidence of the ruling Westerners. Therefore, such transformations very often were merely apparent, or persons grown outside the Judeo-Christian tradition divided their lives and personalities into two separate spheres: “westernised” and “native”. Such painful transformations could be made on the level of an individual and of a family, but it also could be introduced on the societal level or even in the state, in its ideology, institutions and declared values, which could be ignored in practice (as the Indian and Japanese politicians in a most convincing manner).

In this way numerous elements of Western civilisation had been transformed into truly universal, as for instance, national flag, national anthem, etc., and—on the other hand—suit and tie, or Chopin’s music. Other could be well known, but had not been commonly accepted, as western custom of handshaking. Moreover, in the period of globalisation, there were numerous “products” manufactured for “global consumers”, as the musical production of Michael Jackson. The Westerners obviously try to enlarge this sphere and include to the list of

“universal products” many elements rooted in their particular historical experience (as Enlightenment) or rooted in their Christian heritage, but alien to the Buddhists, Hinduists, Moslems, etc. Sometimes in this respect the discussion should be very detailed: for instance, which human rights or principles of democracy should be recognised as truly universal? There is a large room for discussion and controversies.

One has to acknowledge, that in the West, in addition to the primitive universalistic concepts, according to which there is only one Civilisation and “barbarous” people outside, a much more sophisticated “ethnographic concepts” of civilisations had also evolved. The supporters of such views presumed that there are numerous civilisations more or less advanced. Alexander von Humboldt (1769–1859) was one of the pioneers of such concepts (Febvre, 1973, 220, 236). During the World War I. comparisons of civilisations, which included critical evaluations of various western cultural traits, became diffused. The outstanding Chinese scholar Gu Hongming (Ku Hung-ming, 1857–1928) was one of the first Asians, who criticised the Western civilisation, and his work *The Spirit of the Chinese People* had been translated into all major western languages (including Italian, Spanish and Polish). He criticised the two “fundamental elements” of the Western civilisation: the predominance of army and police, and relying on force in general, and on the other hand, a privileged position of religion and clergy. Such structures and methods of ruling the people were, in his opinion, inevitably determined the decline of the West and resulted in horrors for its peoples. For the first time, he suggested the “fusion of Western and Chinese civilisations” as helpful for the survival of Europe. There were other works of this kind, starting with the most famous *The Decline of the West* by Oswald Spengler (1880–1936), published in 1917, and others. Arnold Toynbee (1889–1975) in his monumental work analysed the rise and fall of 23 such civilisations in history. At the end of the 20th century Samuel P. Huntington, as it was mentioned above, had warned the Western powers, in particular the USA, against an imposition of the western norms on other civilisations, which would provoke their clash with the West. In his analysis he distinguished in the contemporary world the following eight civilisations: Chinese, Japanese, Hinduistic, Islamic, Orthodox, Western, and probably—African (Huntington, 1996).

This pluralistic view did not exclude, however, ethnocentric views, since some of these civilisations were more and other less advanced, and Western civilisation had often been presented as hegemonic, representing the ultimate truths and highest universal values. Therefore, the recognition of the existence of numerous civilisations did not modify much the views prevalent in the West that its civilisation is universal, and the entire mankind should adopt its concepts, values and institutions. Civilisation, as Duara maintains, had forfeited the right to represent the highest goals of ultimate values of humanity and was considered worthy of being desired by the Other (Duara, 2002a, 71). Hence the

western norms could even be imposed against Other's will, whereas his ignorance or opposition demonstrated merely his backward or "barbaric" nature.

Now we live in a particular period of a transition from the world dominated and ruled by the West to the evolving multipolar, global world. Shmuel N. Eisenstadt (1923–2010) had elaborated a new concept of "multiple modernities". It presumes that there are certain modern goals and values to be pursued but modernisation does not necessarily require westernization, and various nations could transform their traditional cultures according to the new modern requirements, and they could become "modern" in different ways.<sup>7</sup> This means that in a modern industrial and post-industrial epoch distinct civilisations would exist for the foreseeable future. This substantiates the concept of "dialogue among civilisations and cultures" approved by the UN, and offers a new dimensions for such a dialogue. Numerous Westerners even today imagine this dialogue as one-directional: the "most progressive" and "most humane" western civilisation, truly universal, has to diffuse its values and ideas "teaching" various non-Western people, who still live in more primitive and despotic societies. Eisenstadt explains, that it should be dialogue between various civilisations, equally modern but different. The concept of dialogue presumes that distinct cultural entities should be treated and respected as equal, although there is a room for a certain universal stratum or elements. But it is clear that no one civilisation or culture, and the powers representing them, could impose its own norms, concepts and institutions as "universal". That what is truly universal should result from the spontaneous universal processes or from a decision made by all the states, i.e. by the UN. One could mention that ASEM, the common forum of EU and East Asia adopted the concept of dialogue as the fundamental principle of their partnership.

Karl-Heinz Pohl already indicated that such a dialogue requires:

- A heightened awareness of one's own cultural identity, implying a sound understanding of its roots and its formation;
- A willingness to question the usually unquestioned validity of one's own cultural background and world-view.

As he explains in his analysis, this requires mutual respect and empathy, which would allow seeing the world as others see it (Pohl, 1999, x–xi).

In another study K.H. Pohl indicates numerous factors, which in practice disturb the intercultural dialogue between the West and the "rest". Among he enumerates the following:

- Dialogue presupposes a fundamental equality of the partners, whereas economic and military power or development in general determine actual asymmetric relationship.

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<sup>7</sup> For a concise but precise presentation of this concept see: S. N. Eisenstadt, 2000. See also collection of studies on these topics: S. N. Eisenstadt, ed., 2002; D. Sachsenmaier, S. N. Eisenstadt, J. Riedel, eds., 2002.

— The language used in dialogue (most often American English) contributes to this asymmetry (and—as one could add—creates various impediments for non-western partners related to specific terms, notions and ideas alien to the West).

— There are fundamental differences in historical experience, which formed ideas and values of the partners. The West suffered from religious wars and fierce national rivalries, and inherits the philosophy of Enlightenment, with the spirit of “critical rationalism” and “critical public sphere”, whereas in the history of the “rest” one could hardly find any their equivalent.

— Ethnocentric attitudes are common in all cultures, but they create a great impediment for dialogue. Uncritical ethnocentrism, shared also by the westerners, treats cultural manifestations as mere superficial phenomena and neglects their foundations in the history of ideas and in the structures of values.

— Judging the realities of the Other by one’s own ideals, which covers deep differences in these realities. On the other hand, there is a “similarity trap”, when because of superficial similarities, one presumes that he deals with one and the same phenomena.

— Owing to their ideological universalistic convictions the Westerners often want to level all cultural differences, according to the principle the sooner the better promoting universal westernization, which today is entirely unacceptable and highly irritating for the “rest” (K.H. Pohl, 2011).

At the turn of century East Asia, with China on the first place, became the principal partner of the West, of the United States and the European Union. The Asian countries bring with them on the international arena their own Confucian-Buddhist civilisation, their historical heritage and cultural traditions. Since the beginning of the Western domination the Westerners face for the first time a real challenge: not only an economic competition, but also fundamental cultural differences, which should be understood and accepted as a part of our new polycentric international order. In order to understand properly contemporary Chinese politics and ideas, one should compare and analyse the fundamental differences of both civilisations, with their ancient roots, although there are also important common ideas and values. But these should be indicated basing on the historical experiences of each civilisations, not exclusively on the western heritage and world views.

## **2. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CONCEPTS OF WAR AND PEACE, AND THEIR CULTURAL DIFFERENTIATION**

As Eisenstadt indicates, in the first millennium BC all great civilisations on the Eurasian continent entered the “axial Age”. It was a “revolutions in the realm of ideas”. The new ideas of a homologous mundane and extramundane, transcendental orders emerged, which included the concepts of God(s) and Man. The new ideas served to establishing new institutional structures, and this



shaped new social and political realities. There also emerged new social actors, which promoted and preserved the new order: groups of intellectuals, who developed these ideas and controlled their symbols and media of communication. In Ancient Greece this role played philosophers, in Ancient Israel—prophets, in Ancient China—literati, and so on. It had an irreversible effect on the historical development of each civilisation and determined its distinctive path (S.N. Eisenstadt, 2003, 197–9).

When one compares Western and Chinese civilisations it appears that the most significant differences between them concern their attitudes to war and peace. As numerous anthropologists indicate, their interpretations, and their cultural context constitute the essential characteristic of each culture, although their significance could vary. The Chinese traditions in this respect have been determined first of all by Confucianism and Taoism, whereas the concepts adopted in the West are rooted in the Judeo-Christian tradition and in the archaic Indo-European heritage. Confucian ideas not only shaped politics in China, and in the Sinitic world for two thousands years, but still influence political thinking and values in contemporary East Asia. In order to understand the Chinese traditions and their particular traits, a Westerner should realise first, that numerous essential concepts, values and categories adopted by him as “obvious”, “natural” and “universal”, in fact belong merely to the Western cultural tradition.

The inhabitants of China and their neighbours elaborated different concepts and values, which merely in the 19th and the 20th century were confronted with those of the West and influenced by them. It resulted in complicated cultural transformations in China. East Asia underwent a deep process of Westernization, whereas many of her native traditions have been abandoned, end even rejected. It was a very complex process, which involved heated debates and ideological struggle. The general mode of thinking fluctuated from an obstinate defence of the old tradition to a naive fascination with various Western ideologies and concepts, with their adoption, blind or more or less selective. Recently one could notice the new interests in the native traditions in Asia, including China, and great efforts were undertaken to cultivate them, or to rejuvenate them, and usually Confucianism constituted the central issue (see J. Makeham, 2003).

There were numerous anthropological studies concerning an approach to struggle, confrontation, and war, since they constitute one of the fundamental characteristics of primitive cultures. Erich Fromm in his study of “human destructiveness” summed them up in a description of the three types of cultures and societies:

- a) life-affirmative societies;
- b) non-destructive aggressive societies;
- c) destructive societies (E. Fromm, 1973, 192–204).

In the societies of the first type life is highly valued, there are no much hatred, violence, crimes and severe punishment, and war is unknown or not developed. Competitiveness and individualism are reduced, whereas co-operation prevails. The second type of societies shares with the first the lacks of destructive drives, but there are aggressive tendencies and wars, although they are not essential for their social life. These societies are not so gentle as the first, and the level of mutual confidence is much lower there. On the other hand, they have hierarchical structure, and they accept competitiveness and some individualism. Possession of goods and fulfilling tasks are also valued there. In the third type of societies there is much of violence, destructive activity, aggression and atrocities within the tribe and towards “aliens”. War and harm inflicted to others are treated as *sources of pleasure*, whereas social life is based on enmity, tension and fear. Such societies are usually highly competitive and put great emphasis on private property. These descriptions could be criticised in various respects, but the distinction of these three types of cultures could be useful as a certain theoretical model.

Of course, cultures and traditions of more advanced societies are much more complex. The societies, which formed states and class differences inevitably, waged wars. So, the first of the types enumerated above is absent among them, but one could find two other types of societies: “non-destructive, aggressive societies” and “destructive societies”, with various intermediate cases. Such differences could be detected among nations and cultures of Europe and of East Asia, but are even more evident when one compares Western and the traditional Chinese civilisations as certain wholes, which were differentiated inside and underwent significant transformations at the course of their respective histories. Of course, this comparison must not be oversimplified. In Europe there were more and less belligerent cultures, and in East Asia there were even greater differences. For instance, the nomadic peoples of the steppes and numerous peoples of the Southern Seas were much more bellicose than the peasants of the Chinese Central Plain.

However, in general one could conclude that Western civilisation contained many traits of the “destructive societies”, whereas the traditional Chinese civilisation fluctuated between the “life-affirmative societies” and “non-destructive aggressive societies”. Their respective ideals and norms could be detected in various spheres of life. For instance, the Confucian model of family contained such ideals as tranquil life, mutual confidence, gentility and accord. Other groups, to which an individual belongs, also imitated this model. On the other hand, the norms of the second type (involving enmity, cheating, violence and oppression) were allowed in the relations with “alien groups” and with their members. Both modes and approaches were considered inseparable aspects of political life. The first was identified with *wen*—“culture and civil administration”, whereas the second with *wu*—“use of force, punishment and military means”. Such views and values were propagated, and petrified by the imperial

Confucian ideology, although in practice the behaviour and actions of the third type, of “destructive societies”, could occasionally also be noticed, in particular in the relations with “alien” groups, considered hostile or even not treated as humans.

### 3. TRADITIONAL WESTERN APPROACHES TO WAR

Western civilisation could be described as “bellicose” and its struggle-oriented approach could be seen in various aspects. It is characterised by fascination with struggle, military heroes and competition, related to its exaggerated individualism. Struggle and war were glorified, fighting was often considered a noble duty, and warriors constituted the class of nobles that ruled the states and enjoyed various privileges. Hunting and sports, based on the principle of struggle and serving as an exercise to war, constituted favourable recreation for noble warriors, whereas productive work was held in contempt, as attributed to the “lower classes”. Under such circumstances warriors, who constituted the privileged, ruling class, glorified military values and virtues, conquests, booty taking, and subduing others. Political predomination of a bellicose aristocracy facilitated, of course, the diffusion of its norms and values in the society.

Georges Dumézil considered this bellicose orientation truly archaic, belonging to the common cultural heritage of the Indo-European peoples and cultures. According to him, their value system and political structure had been reflected in a tripartite structure of their religious pantheons. The gods responsible for maintenance of order and law giving were at the top; below there were—bellicose gods of war; whereas the lowest echelon constituted gods and goddess of fertility, good harvest and prosperity. This hierarchy of gods—in his opinion—corresponded to the archaic social and political structures: priests were most respected; warriors had a lower position, but they ruled; whereas the working people, who had to provide means of subsistence to the upper social strata, were held in contempt. Therefore the Indo-European aristocrats considered waging war almost their “profession”, and treated it as the noble and prestigious task, second in order after praying and sacrifices (G. Dumézil, 1956).

These concepts provoked heated debates and various reservations have been presented, but it appears that they illustrate essential traits of Western civilisation. Bellicosity outlined above and a “chivalrous code of fighting” related to glorification of struggle, so characteristic to the Western cultures, could evolve and develop in such a cultural and social context. Warriors’ concept of honour and of personal dignity required almost permanent search for battles and duelling, (or for bullying in modern times) on the one hand, and permanent tendency to subdue others and/or to manifest one’s own superiority over the others.

In this Western appreciation of struggle and war the two intermingling tendencies could be detected. The first put an emphasis on their laic functions. It treated war, armed struggle and struggle in general as “heroic deeds”, a kind of

game for “true men”, or an action granting profits, fame and enrichment. In political aspects war was treated as a means to resolve conflicts, enlarge territory, achieve superiority over other states, etc. Sport competition is rooted in this tradition.

The second tendency was different. In this interpretation armed struggle has a mystical value and it was rooted in various religious archetypes. One of the most important constituted the concept of Sacrifice. Armed struggle had been treated as a kind of a semi-religious sacrifice (of war heroes, of one’s life, of one’s own nation, or even of the enemy). The second treated struggle as a kind of prayer, as emulating bellicose gods and their creative or destructive activities, etc. In the modern period it could be presented as the creation of History or as “executing the destiny”, as almost “holy” service to a nation, to the “progress”, etc. The third archetype constituted the struggle of the Forces of Light and of Good against the Forces of Darkness and of Evil. Such a struggle is essential for Christianity, in which Devil fights against God, and Jesus Christ at the very end of the world eventually defeats Satan for ever. In the meantime such a struggle carries out Saint Gorge or Archangel Michael, who defeat demonic forces. Each Christian should fight a similar struggle in his life. The Western leaders very often presented their wars as such a struggle against Evil. One of the oldest descriptions of such a war presents the mediaeval *Song of Roland* about the Carl the Great’s struggle against Saracens in Spain in the years 778. It presents a crusade against forces of Evil embodied in the Moslem. Hence “the spirits of killed Moslems are taken away by Satan”, whereas dead Christians become “holy martyrs” and go to the Paradise (J. O’Hogan 1910, episode XCIX, XCII, CXXVI). Such images play important role even in the contemporary politics in the West. For instance, during the World War II the Allies fought against the Axis presented as the forces of Evil; during the Cold War the Free World opposed the Communist forces of Evil, and the US President Ronald Reagan openly declared that he has to defeat the Soviet “Empire of Evil”. President George W. Bush, and his acolytes, declared in 2001 that they fight their “war against terror” acting according to the wishes of God against Evil. These announcements indirectly indicated that these “leaders of the West” themselves represent the forces of Good, and it was widely accepted there.

Owing to this semi-religious reverence struggle acquired a particular importance and even “sacredness” in Western minds. In the laic vision warrior’s personal courage and heroic deeds were of crucial importance, whereas in the “holy war concept” it was God or History that determined eventual victory. In such a cultural context the custom of erecting monuments to celebrate military victories and of paying homage to the heroes of war evolved very early, already in the first millennium BC.

In the Western tradition warriors constituted a “ruling class” and participated in the state affairs. A particular concept of fellowship-in-arms and equality characterised them. Hence there was a truly ancient tradition of electing a su-

preme commander-king by the warriors, of organising their meetings for making important decision, etc. Such traditions shaped Greek and Roman democratic traditions and military democracy of the medieval “barbarians” (K. Modzelewski, 2004).

In ancient Greece and among the European “barbarians” one could even find an identification of a free citizen, or a grown-up man, with a “soldier”. For instance, Tacitus (ca AD 54 – ca 120), an eminent Roman historian, noticed that the German tribes “transact no public or private business without being armed”. When a boy reached maturity there was a particular public ceremony of equipping him with a shield and a spear. “Up to this time he was regarded as a member of a household, afterwards as a member of the commonwealth.” Medieval knighting a noble boy was an elaborate ritual based on this ancient tradition.

Tacitus describes Germans’ bellicose mentality as following:

When they go into battle, it is a disgrace for the chief to be surpassed in valour, a disgrace for his followers not to equal the valour of the chief. And it is an infamy and reproach for life to have survived the chief, and returned from the field. To defend, to protect him, to ascribe one’s own brave deeds to his renown, is the height of loyalty... If their native states sink into the sloth of prolonged peace and repose, many of its noble youths voluntarily seek those tribes which are waging some war, both because inaction is odious to their race, and because they win renown more readily in the midst of peril, and cannot maintain a numerous following except by violence and war... Feasts and entertainment, which, though inelegant, are plentifully furnished, are their only pay. The means of this bounty come from war and rapine. Nor are they easily persuaded to plough the earth and to wait for the year’s produce as to challenge an enemy and earn the honour of wounds (Tacitus, 1877, 90–1).

He mentions that at every public gathering a spectacle is exhibited: naked youths practice the sport bound in the dance amid swords and lances threatening their lives. These descriptions are not necessarily precise, since Tacitus obviously idealises to some extent the “barbarians” to advocate virtues already forgotten in Rome, but still appreciated by his contemporaries. The Roman Empire was based on military power, glorified wars and military victories.

Western bellicose mentality resulted in innumerable wars and conquest on incomparable scale. It was presented in the most eloquent way by John Ruskin (1819–1900), an eminent British thinker and theoretician of art, who acquired prominence at the time of the emerging Victorian global empire, echoing ancient bellicose traditions. He treated war as an affair that offers the most favourable conditions to development of nations, and to flourishing of arts and of virtues. On December 14th, 1869, he instructed the cadets of the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich as follows:

When I tell you that war is the foundation of all the arts, I mean also that it is a foundation of all the high virtues and faculties of men. It is very strange to me to discover this, and very dreadful, but I saw it to be quite and undeniable fact... I found, in brief, that all great nations learned their truth of word and strength of thought in war; that they were nourished in war and wasted by peace; taught by war and deceived by peace; trained by war and betrayed by peace; in a word, that they were born in war and expired in peace (J. Ruskin, 1907, 115).

Hence he also maintained that from the dawn of civilisation people are divided into two races: “workers” and “players”. The later are noble and bellicose, proud and looking for entertainment, fascinated with adventure and risk, creative, developing arts and virtues. They treat the “workers” merely as “useful cattle”. The drive for domination and power—according to him—promotes human development. War was for him a principal mechanism of this development, of the necessary periodical “moral purification” and of “social rectification”, that save the society from moral degradation and decadence. In his opinion only the nation of warriors, based on courageous engagements in battles, as the British of this epoch, could progress, develop arts and noble mores, and warriors rightly dominate the simple, working people. In the 19th and the 20th centuries in the West there were, of course, not only writers and theoreticians who glorified war in various aspects, but also those who tried to promote peace.

However, the concepts linking progress and development with war were so diffused in the West that even the advocates of peace and of harmonious social relations were perplexed whether peace would halt any progress. For instance, during the Cold War Irving Luis Horowitz maintained that *struggle within society is the deciding factor in social growth itself*. As he indicated, we are confronted with the historical fact that the progress of society in the past often proceeded through a test of armed might, rather than by an avoidance of it. In some cases, but merely on the national level progress could proceed “through *either* war or peace. Whereas in the world as a whole, no such alternative exists”. Social changes, progress in science and culture—as he concluded—could be halted by the elimination of struggle and war, and on the other hand a thermonuclear war could mark the end of civilisation. Thus the requirements of progress and of universal peace, as he maintained, are difficult to reconcile (I. L. Horowitz, 1973, 17–8).

Such concepts of inevitability of war and of its great significance were rooted in particular philosophical vision of the world. Struggle was treated in the West as a “manifestation of nature at work”, as an essence of “being”, a mechanism of creation/destruction, and of development. War in such a framework was considered a particular type of struggle (as armed conflict between autonomous sociopolitical entities) or as a metaphor of struggle in general. Indo-European mythology contains various descriptions of struggle through

which the new world-order has been created. Zeus, the supreme god for the Ancient Greeks, dethroned his father Cronos and other Titans of the older, ruling generation at the course of a great war (*Titanomachia*). The earlier phases of Greek cosmogony are also based on struggle. One could find similar traits in India. For instance, Indo-Aryan god Indra defeated the dragon Vritra and liberated waters closed by him. One could notice, that in general in Indo-European mythology dragon represents the evil or demonic forces, and there are numerous legends of heroic struggle against dragons. In the Ancient Greek sculptures of the famous war of the Olympic gods against the Titans the latter are presented as half-humans and half-dragons. Similar images have been used in Ancient Persia by Zoroastrians for Mayinyu Mazda, an embodiment of the forces of Darkness fighting against the forces of Light. According to Christian beliefs Archangel Michael, the commander of God's armed forces, successfully defeats with his arms the dragon representing demonic forces. St. George is another famous Christian fighter against the dragon. Merely at the end of the world, at the days of the Last Judgement, Jesus Christ will eventually defeat Satan forever. One could notice, that in the Judeo-Christian tradition snake also represents the diabolic forces, as a similar creature. Hence in the primordial Paradise Eva had been induced to sin by a snake, and Saint Mary is often represented as trampling a snake. It should be pointed out, that in East Asia dragons are beneficial and noble creatures, bringing rains and commanding waters, and this concerns also snakes treated as "embodiments" of dragons. The mythical dragon-snake Naga is often presented as protecting Lord Buddha, imagined as a protector of his teaching or even is identified with Buddha himself or with the beings of the Buddha level in general.

It seems highly significant that in the West the idea of primordial or eschatological struggle has very archaic roots. The ancient Indian warrior-god Indra opened space for the Sun venerated as the god Surya, as well as for light and rain, and waged innumerable wars against black people, the Dasas, taking booty and acquiring new lands. In the Indo-Iranian mythology this primordial war is obviously related to the struggle of Light against the Darkness, of Good and Order against Evil and Chaos. Similar motives could also be detected in ancient Egyptian mythology. Hence the Christian antagonistic dualism, essential for the Western world-view has very ancient roots.

It is even essential for the Western concept of Man. In Christian imagination and writings each individual constitutes a "spiritual battlefield" on which the forces of Good struggle against the forces of Evil, noble and pure intentions against base greed, lust, etc. When a Westerner reads East Asian novels he is often perplexed by their "flat" heroes. They usually are involved merely in contradictions external to them and have to fight against external forces or foes, whereas the western heroes appear "deeper", since they fight first of all a spiritual struggle inside themselves, against their own base instincts, or have to choose which duty is more important.

It seems that Heraclitus (6th–5th century BC) was the first Western thinker, who presented the concepts of struggle in a philosophical, abstract form. Unfortunately, merely small fragments of his works survived. As he stated:

*War (Polemos) is the father of all things and governs all things; it reveals ones as gods and others as humans, determines that ones are slaves and others free men (fragment 53).*

*War must be common to all things; the supreme justice (dike) and strife (eris) and all things arise and pass away through strife and according to destiny (fragment 80).*

Aristotle (384–322 BC) adds:

*Heraclitus states that ‘the oppositions—merge and from the divergences emerges the most beautiful harmony; all things come into being through strife.’<sup>8</sup>*

As an Italian scholar points out, Heraclitus’ concepts are elaborate and complex. According to this ancient philosopher, war must not and cannot be stopped, since exclusively in war *philia*, i.e. “friendship” is born, that constitutes the source of harmony and cohesion of the *polis* (city-state). The most beautiful harmony—as Heraclitus maintained—consists in an eternal conflict of the opposition. Hence war itself grants real peace that is based on “balanced oppositions”, each part of which could flourish without reaching predominance. Moreover, Heraclitus presumes that there are two kinds of harmony: one visible and another—invisible that is much more beautiful and powerful, and the latter determines the former (Cacciari, 1987, 155, 158–9).

Hence the Mediterranean concept of an “ontological struggle”, inherited and developed by the West, so crucial for Christianity as an eternal struggle of the forces of Evil and Darkness against the forces of Good and Light, the struggle of Satan against God, has multiple roots and dimensions. Such struggle constituted the essence of spiritual life of each individual and determines the crucial Western concepts of *freedom* and of *choice*. It is an essence of “autonomous self” considered by the westerners characteristic for Man in general. There are also socio-political and eschatological dimensions intermingling together. These western concepts of autonomous individuals and of eternal struggle are also essential for the contemporary western ideals of democracy and of human rights, which outside the Judeo-Christian civilisation have merely practical values, but are deprived their theological and philosophical basis. Hence the concept of such a struggle, in its Christian form, could be considered a fundamental *archetype* of the Western civilisation difficult to apprehend outside its borders.

<sup>8</sup> These quotations have been translated here according to their interpretation by Massimo Cacciari and other Italian scholars. See: Cacciari, 1987, p. 156. The last quotation derives from *Nicomachean Ethics*, ch. 8. Slightly different translations of Heraclitus’ statements are given in: Nahm, M.C. (ed.), 1945, 91–2.



It did not only justify struggle carried out by various subjects and legitimise struggle as such, but also presented it as a “glorious action” and fulfilment of a “moral mission”, etc.

In the prevalent opinion of Western thinkers in the universe there are various conflicts, merely their forms and nature vary. There are ontological-and-moral struggles, as an eternal struggle of the satanic forces against God, and these less glorious aiming at profits, prestige, or merely for survival. Violent struggle could be destructive or could produce peace based on a kind of coexistence of oppositions, although their struggle never ceases. This archetype of struggle also implies primordial “ontological pluralism”, unknown in East Asia, where the concepts of Oneness and Unity predominated.

Therefore a particular “partnership” of foes could evolve as an age-old tradition of the Indo-European peoples. Rüdiger Safranski rightly notices that the Ancient Greeks and Romans perceived the universe (*universum*) as “plurivers” (*pluriversum*), since it was divided into diverse parts and was of a pluralistic nature. Later on such views had been even more elaborate. As Safranski indicates, contradictions and conflicts, resulting of this pluralism, constitute the basis of politics for many contemporary Western thinkers, as Carl Schmitt or Helmuth Plessner. As they indicated, where there are no contradictions and struggle—no politics (Safranski, 1997, chapter 7–8). The western concepts of liberal democracy based on pluralism of antagonist forces and on their “free struggle” according to certain chivalrous norms are closely related to this cultural context.

This heritage explains why since the ancient times Western thinkers treated with contempt the political systems in which internal struggle and open manifestation of opposition were absent, such as Persian and other Oriental empires. The Westerners, as it appears, simply could not understand the systems based on the principle of unity, which was to them “contradicting human nature and the nature of the universe”. Despotic regimes appeared to them highly oppressive, since—as they believed—merely force could halt the opposition to manifest itself. Liberal democracy has been perceived in the West as “beneficial competition of various political forces” based on the “right to oppose the government”. In this cultural context even dictatorship had been based on the concept of struggle, at this case “against dangerous enemies of the nation/state” (outside and/or inside the state). Primordial pluralism and strife, which result of it, were for the Westerners simply “natural” and “inevitable” under every circumstance.

Western thinkers have adopted similar approach to all phenomena in the world. The concept of “market economy” granting prosperity and development, elaborated by Adam Smith (1723–1790), is based on the principle of free struggle and competition. Western scholars believe that the scientific truth could be reached through free competition of laboratories and researchers. Charles R. Darwin (1809–1882) promoted such a concept to explain the evolution of spe-

cies, Karl Marx (1818–1883) applied the concept of “class struggle” to history. Samuel P. Huntington presented the vision of the “clash of civilisations” as a dangerous scenario of the future, and so on. Even the idea of the tripartite division of powers in the state advocated by Charles L. Montesquieu (1689–1755), and the entire principle of checks and balances are rooted in this tradition, hence it is so difficult to introduce in East Asia since their philosophical and theological basis is missing. The Westerners could not image the reality without antagonistic forces, which should freely operate, and without an institutional framework that prevents degeneration to chaos. Hence personal political freedoms, freedoms of expression and the rights of the individual are so fundamental to them. Under such circumstances “Choice” acquired particular significance, since it is related to the individual freedom to choose Good or Evil. Therefore the East Asian appreciation of “orderly society” as the highest ideal is almost incomprehensible for the Westerners.

The World War I and the World War II constituted the turning point in the history of the West. They resulted in the condemnation of war and military conquest, as well as militaristic ideology. But even later on war-mongering attitudes were often manifested and struggle was often glorified. Merely its military forms have been condemned and restricted to “particular cases” as a “means of the last resort”. However, these transformations changed mentality of the Europeans, in particular after the Cold War, but were much more restricted in the USA, as illustrate the “war against terrorism” and the intervention in Afghanistan to build there a Western-type democratic state incomprehensible and unacceptable there.

#### 4. THE CONFUCIAN APPROACH TO WAR

Chinese civilisation represents a different type of culture, since it followed another path of political evolution. As an eminent American sinologist Herrlee G. Creel (1905–1994) pointed out, Romans’ main industry was war, they venerated Aeneas, the Trojan warrior, as their ancestral hero, and ascribed the founding of their city to Romulus, the son of Mars, the god of war. Military service and achievements carried the highest prestige there. *In China*—as he stated—*the concentration of fervour that the Romans devoted to war were channelled into government* (H. G. Creel, 1970, 251). Civilian administrators have been the great heroes there, and military career and positions were almost invariably considered inferior to civil ones. Classical Chinese literature in general produces, according to him, two impressions. Although war was common, those who fought it *derived very little pleasure of it*. Moreover one scarcely could find there anything that could be called a “battle scene”, in the sense of a description of battle, in which the exploits of individual warriors are recounted in detail. One could find numerous such scenes, for instance, in *Aeneid*, but not in ancient Chinese works (ibid.254). Other scholars also notices this characteristic of Chi-

nese literature, in particular poetry, indicate “the ellipsis of battle”, since the actual clash of arms is always left unsaid, and there are no detailed narratives of the heroic actions (C. H. Wang, 1975, 29).

As Creel concludes, in the Western Zhou period (11th? century—771 BC) warfare was regarded an important and sometimes necessary task, but insofar as the sources indicate, rather distasteful. *There is little suggestion of any thought by officers or men of failure to perform their duty, but neither is there evidence that war was thought of as an enjoyable game (ibid. 256–7)*. Later on, as he adds, at least since the beginning of the Han epoch (206 BC—AD 220) military actions were considered a “necessary evil”.

According to him, in the Western Zhou period appreciation of civil administration and disdain for military activity already prevailed. The situation changed in the Spring and Autumn period (770–476 BC), when numerous wars were waged by ruling aristocracy, and warriors had been esteemed more highly than administrators. Then even chivalrous code of fighting evolved, at least in its embryo form. However, the time of Confucius (551–479 BC) marked a turning point: after his time the glorification of war declined and it was eventually disdained. A large body of works edited or written by Confucian scholars, later on considered “canonical”, played a principal role in this evolution, in particular since the reign of Emperor Wudi 武帝 (140–87 BC) of the Han Dynasty, when Confucianism was declared a state ideology. Disdain for war and military activity, so characteristic for Confucianism, shaped the mentality of the ruling elite.

As David A. Graff points out, the Chinese scholarly elite of the imperial period was often actively hostile to the warfare and to the military sphere in general. Its members *esteemed the civil and literary virtues (wen 文) over the martial virtues (wu 武), and regarded the resort to arms as an undesirable option, almost a confession of [political] failure*. In their practical actions they usually reduced the power and influence of military officials within the imperial polity, and sometimes even openly argued against military expeditions beyond empire’s borders. The official reports and descriptions contained in the numerous and voluminous official histories of the subsequent dynasties contain similar statements. The actual course of battles is usually passed there in silence, whereas historians tend to focus on pre-battle deliberations and on post-battle explanations of applied strategy. Such practice led not only to omissions in historical sources, but even to significant distortions (D. A. Graff, 2002, 7).

Mark E. Lewis outlines very complex transformation processes from the Spring and Autumn culture of the warrior-aristocrats, that appreciated to some extent military pursuits, to the new “Confucian culture”. He also points out one of their components, rarely properly explained. Strategic literature initiated by Sun Wu 孫武, most probably a contemporary of Confucius, promoted a new vision of war very distant from its heroic images cultivated by the old warrior aristocracy and from the Western chivalrous standards. It propagated precise assessment of situation, the use of masses of organised soldiers treated as ob-

jects of manipulations, and recommended recourse to stratagems. Since these times, Lewis concludes, it was the commander who determined the outcome of prolonged war, not individual heroic deeds of warrior-aristocrats, who previously could win a battle on their chariots within several hours (M. L. Lewis, 1990, 103). The small armies of almost professional aristocratic warriors, that numbered several thousand, at most twenty or thirty thousand, had been substituted by the mass armies of the peasant conscripts, which may surpass a hundred of thousands. The chivalrous code of struggle was rejected as useless, since war was not any more a “matter of honour”, but a state enterprise aiming at achievement of precise political gains. All means that served these ends were considered “justified”, without considerations whether they are “noble” or “ignoble”. Every Chinese commander knew Su Wu’s principle: *not fight, but subdue enemy’s soldiers* (*bu zhen er qu ren zhi bing* 不戰而屈人之兵, *Sunzi*, ch. III), and the general concept *war is based on deception and manipulations* (*bing zhe gui dao ye* 兵者詭道也, *Sunzi*, ch. I).<sup>9</sup> I had been applied not only in war, but in various contradictory relations (Gawlikowski, 1995). Confucian ideas of benevolent rule and strategic concepts of the most efficient actions resulted in a tendency: to avoid bloodshed as much as possible and to manifest benevolent attitude towards the civil population. Such ideas had even been incorporated into the Chinese classical military works, where one could find such a recommendation: *gain the submission of the entire world without staining the troops’ blades with blood* (*bing bu xue ren er tian xia qin* 兵不血刃而天下親, *Weiliaozi*, ch. VIII).

These concepts influenced real Chinese politics. One could compare, for instance, the enlargement of the Chinese territory during the last two thousand years with the conquests by Chingiz Khan (ca. 1161–1227), Alexander the Great (356–323 BC), Napoleon Bonaparte (1769–1821), Adolf Hitler (1889–1945) or by the Spanish, Dutch, and British kings. Of course, wars have been waged among the Chinese states in the times of division, and against the foes beyond the borders of the Empire. Nevertheless, the scale of Chinese invasions was much smaller than this attempted in Europe and Near East. It would be even more striking, when one would compare the Chinese economic and demographic potential, with the potential of the Mongolian state, Macedonia, France, or Germany. One should, however, bear in mind the complexity of Chinese history and realities. “China” encompassed dozens of peoples, tribes, diverse cultures, and more or less autonomous states. The ancient Qin state, which at the course of bloody wars eventually completed the unification of the Chinese states in 221 BC and created the Empire was inhabited mostly by the Turkish population. The Yuan (1271–1368) and the Qing (1644–1912) periods, when

<sup>9</sup> For all quotations of this work the original Chinese text is used here, its most integral version: *Wei Wudi zhu Sunzi*. See also its critical modern editions: Wu Jiulong 1990; Li Ling, 2006. For other English translations see, R. D. Sawyer, 1993; R. T. Ames, 1993; The Denma Group, 2002, J. Minford, 2003; V. H. Mair, 2007.

respectively the Mongol and the Manchu dynasties ruled China, were the epochs of great wars and conquests. Whereas the Confucian ruling elite, in particular the Chinese, disdained warfare, other ethnic groups were much more bellicose. Even among the ethnic Chinese there were groups known for their belligerency, such as the inhabitants of the Hunan province, or the Hakkas (*Kejia* 客家). City folk in medieval China were much more fascinated with fighting and armed struggle than the gentry and peasants. Hence in the works of popular Chinese literature, such as the most popular for centuries *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* (*Sanguo yanyi* 三國演義), one could find a particular fascination with war, fighting, physical strength and abilities.<sup>10</sup>

There were also schools of thought, such as ancient Legists (*fajia* 法家), who treated war as the principal social and political mechanism of strengthening the state. A state that remains in peace and grants its citizens prosperity and tranquil life was—according to them—destined to decline. The Qin state that united China adopted their teaching and advocated militaristic ideology of wars and conquests. The Mohists (*mojia* 墨家) who condemned war and struggle in the most eloquent way, allowed the use of force for a “just cause”. They even created a kind of the knight-order that defended the weak and oppressed, and acquired fame as “experts of warfare”.<sup>11</sup> The Strategists (*bingjia* 兵家) recommended the restriction of violence to the minimum, and warned that war must not be enjoyed, but accepted war as a necessary means to the very survival of the state. In their writings and in other miscellaneous works one could find the statements that war is inevitable and could not be ceased, since struggle is a natural phenomenon common to animals and humans alike.

One can read, for instance, in the texts excavated in 1972, attributed to Sun Bin 孫臏, (fl. 380–320 BC):

To assail with fangs and to jab with horns; to tear with claws in front and fling out with hooves behind; when enamoured to unite together, when angry to attack—this is the natural way, which cannot be impeded. Hence those who have no natural weapons (i.e. man) have to prepare them by themselves; it was the task of the sages.

Then the author enumerates military inventions of the mythological Chinese rulers.<sup>12</sup> The quoted excavated text appears to be a source for numerous similar statements in other later sources. It is also significant, that according to the traditional vision, the Chinese statehood has evolved in the course of great wars.

<sup>10</sup> It is attributed to Luo Guanzhong 羅貫中 (ca. 1330–1400), but these stories circulated earlier for centuries in oral form. For its translation see Moss Roberts, 1994.

<sup>11</sup> For the description of the classical Chinese thought see, for instance, Benjamin Schwartz, 1985 and D. Bodde, 1953.

<sup>12</sup> *Sun Bin bingfa*, ch. *Shi bei* 勢備; Zhang Zhenze, 1984, 78; D.C. Lau, R.T. Ames, trans., 2003, 118–9; here the text in a different author’s translation. See also more detailed description of these concepts in K. Gawlikowski, 1991.

The mythological Yellow Emperor (*Huangdi* 黃帝), who ruled the Middle State subdued the “emperors of the four parts of the world” creating the “first empire”. He waged most difficult wars with the rulers of the south, who invented weapons. He is described as the founder of the art of war and of battle formations<sup>13</sup> (today he is venerated as the ancestor of all the Chinese). In the later epochs almost all founders of the new dynasties acquired the throne as leaders of the victorious armies. Hence the general conclusion was formulated that political power is acquired “from a horseback”, but in order to rule the country the emperor “must get down from the horse”,<sup>14</sup> i.e. use political, civil means.

Since the 2nd century BC, when Confucianism was adopted as the imperial ideology, the concepts that appreciated the use of force disappeared or were openly condemned, as Legism. But Confucianism itself to a certain extent recognised the necessity of coercion and of recourse to arms. As tradition indicates Confucius’ disciples studied “the six arts”: etiquette, music, archery, chartering, writing, and calculations. Two of them (archery and chartering) were of the “military” nature, and in these times all of them were “obligatory” to a gentleman. And this reflects the customs of the earlier period. Confucius obviously put an emphasis on studying books and on civil abilities, but he also recognised the necessity of some military skills. As Daniel A. Bell rightly adds, Confucians held, for instance, those smaller states must prepare to defend themselves. Confucius even stated:

After a master has trained the common people for seven years, they should be ready to take up arms. To send a people to war untrained is to throw them away (*Analects*, XIII.30).<sup>15</sup>

Obviously he considered military training of conscripts a mere necessity for survival of the state. Mencius 孟子 (c. 372–289 BC), one of the greatest sages of the school, known for his concept that “virtuous rule” grant victory even over the best equipped enemy troops, was also a realist. He had given, for instance, such an advice to a ruler of a small state:

<sup>13</sup> The most diffused story of his rule and achievements is contained in *Shi ji* 史記 [Records of the Historian] by Sima Qian. 司馬遷 (c. 145–86 BC), 1972, pp. 1–10 (ch. 1). There are numerous good Chinese collections of ancient sources, which describe these myths, for instance, Yuan Ke, Zhou Ming, 1985, pp. 31–108. See also a good English description: Lihui Yang, Deming An, 2005, pp. 92–94, 138–145.

<sup>14</sup> This famous statement is attributed to Lu Jia 陸賈 (3rd–2nd century BC), a famous politician and one of the closest associates of the emperor Gaozu 高祖, the founder of the Han Dynasty (206 BC – AD 220). See: *Shi ji*, quoted edition, p. 2699 (ch. 97).

<sup>15</sup> Daniel A. Bell quotes only the second half of this statement (in Simon Leys translation). Here D.C. Lau’s translation is quoted, with a small modification, as the simplest one. See: D. C. Lau, trans., 1987, p. 123.

Dig deeper moats and build higher walls and defend them shoulder to shoulder with the people. If they would rather die than desert you, then all is not lost (*Mengzi*, I B, 13; D. C. Lau, 1970, 71).

As Bell sums up, in the real world dominated by great powers rulers of small states must get the people on their side, train them for self-defence, and fortify territorial boundaries (D.A.Bell, 2008, 231). This scholar clearly distinguishes Confucian ideals, the appreciation of peace and rule by virtues and benevolence not by force, from practical advises adapted to the “real world” (2008, 232).

The Confucian theory of state distinguished the *Wen* 文 and the *Wu* 武 elements. The first embodied the “Yang means”, i.e. education, rituals, morality, literature, prizes, and civil means in general; whereas the second embodied the “Yin means”, i.e. the use of force, punishment, bellicosity, stratagems and tricks, and the “military means” in general. The *Wen* was given precedence, but *Wu* was considered necessary and complementary. The seasons of *Wen* it was life-giving spring and autumn, whereas *Wu* predominated in autumn and winter. In the central, civilised land, *Wen* should reign, and in the barbarian peripheries *Wu* governed (Gawlikowski, 1987–88). Since the Western Han period (206 BC—AD 25) until the beginning of the 20th century all offices in the imperial bureaucracy were divided into such two “classes”: “civil” *wen* and “military” *wu*. During official presentations of the authorities or receptions the officials performing such duties wear different dress and had to stay respectively on the left and on the right. The “military” officials were responsible not only for various military affairs, but also for punishment, prisons, guards, some public works, etc. One person could be promoted from a military to civil offices, or *vice versa*, many times in his political career to fulfil various tasks, although civil offices were usually considered “higher” from the military of the same rank. It could be stated that in the empire based on Confucian ideology the civil type bureaucracy prevailed and civil mentality and ethos dominated. As numerous Western observers noticed at the 19<sup>th</sup> and beginning of the 20th century, Chinese generals and officers were not “military” in the Western sense and presented themselves rather as “scholars”.

In general, the Chinese disdained wars and military service. Numerous theoreticians warned the Chinese politicians against large conquests. One of the best known was the statement by Wu Qi 吳起 (d. 381 BC), one of the most renowned Chinese strategists:

To win victory is easy, but to preserve this what was won—is difficult. Hence it is said, that among the fighting states of the world, one which gains five victories—suffers calamity; one which gains four—is exhausted; [the ruler] who gains three—achieves a hegemony; he who gains two—becomes a king; and one who won merely once—becomes the emperor [ruling the world]. Those who [successfully] conquered the world through numerous

victories are extremely rare, whereas those who thereby perished are many (*Wuzi*, ch. I).<sup>16</sup>

Listening such instructions for centuries the Chinese rulers and commanders never dreamed of conquests similar to these by the western rulers. Probably the rejection of the policy of great military conquests, as immoral and impractical, is one of the reasons why China survived until now, whereas all other ancient empires disappeared.

One should also bear in mind that in such a cultural context wars and military pursuits were not appreciated much, generals did not acquire fame and “eternal glory” as in Europe, and the military commanders did not play a prominent role in politics either. The soldiers, as they were described in Chinese literature, were poor creatures separated from their families, and brought to foreign lands, to fulfil unpleasant duties imposed on them by the state. In the *Book of Songs*, a famous Confucian classic, one could read, for instance, such a poetic description:

*I climb that hill covered with grass  
And look towards where my parents stay.  
My father says ‘Alas!  
My son’s on service so far away;  
Cannot repose night nor day.  
O may he take care of himself,  
To come back and not remain there.*

*I climb that hill devoid of grass  
And look towards where my parents stay.  
My mother says ‘Alas!  
My youngest son on service far away,  
Cannot sleep well night nor day.  
O may he take care of himself  
To come back and not be captive there.<sup>17</sup>*

The young soldier continues his song revoking memories of his older brother (abbreviated here). Could one imagine the heroes of *Iliad* or the *Song of Roland* so lamenting that they are so far from the mom and from daddy, and from the good older brother who takes care? Could they be preoccupied first of all about their safe return home from an unwanted military campaign? In the *Book of*

<sup>16</sup> *Wuzi zhijie* [The Book of Master Wu with Straight Explanations], p. 384 (ch. 1); trans. by the author; see also a translation by R. D. Sawyer, 1993, p. 208.

<sup>17</sup> *Shi jing* 詩經 [The Book of Songs]; see translations: James Legge, 1972, vol. 4, 167–8 (book IX, ode IV); A. Walley, 1987, 115; Xi Yuannzhong (1994, 171) and Legge’s translation had been adopted here with minor modifications.



*Songs* even the royal guard, professional, selected soldiers lament in a similar way for hardships of military campaign.

As Stephen Owen points out, in the *Book of Songs* one could notice a surprising lack of violence. In this Confucian classic, that contain material of the 11th–5th centuries BC, edited by Confucius himself as generations of scholars believed, there was some glorification of Zhou military power. It could be seen in the descriptions of fast chariots, blazing valour, rank upon rank of warriors, but blood is hardly ever shed. Even the conquests of new lands are usually presented there as the willing acceptance of the new lords by the native people. In Homer's works each warrior seeks his personal glory. In the Confucian classic military heroism is rare and it is directed first of all to public glory (or the glory of their ancestors and clan—as M. Lewis indicates, 1990, 36), and the Zhou heroes are praised for their valour and their sagacious execution of state policy. The army is essentially—as Owen notices—a collective force, “the king's claws and fangs”. When the threat of violence is presented there, it is immediately balanced by some justifications of the use of force: reestablishment of the moral order and the granting of peace. The complains on the military service are much more numerous there than even restricted praise of military power and victories. In the “military” songs contained therein the soldiers, in general, are prevented from desertion only by the fear of punishment, and do not express their fascination with a military enterprise or conquest in any way (A. Waley, 1987, xiv–xviii).

In general, one could distinguish the four main types of Chinese “military heroes” portrayed in the best way in the most famous medieval novel, *Romance of the Three Kingdoms*, mentioned above. Guan Yu 關羽 (d. AD 219), who subsequently became one of the principal Chinese deities, embodies a “virtuous warrior” and is known for loyalty to his master. Cao Cao 曹操 (155–220), his great adversary, could be treated as a model “villain”, whereas Zhuge Liang 諸葛亮 (181–234) is the “most famous Chinese strategist”. Zhang Fei 張飛, on the other hand, represents a heroic, but impulsive and rouge fighter (R. Ruhlman, 1978, 147, 149–54). It is highly significant that the last, an able fighter of the strong complexion, and of very masculine appearance, who mostly resembles Western military heroes, is presented there without great admiration. It was Zhuge Liang, a cabinet scholar with immense knowledge, who invented innumerable stratagems and tricks, became the most renowned Chinese “master of war”. He fascinated Chinese commanders until the 20th century. For centuries his example served as an illustration of the “eternal truth” that strategy is first of all the art of deceiving the enemy and of inventing stratagems, not the art of the operating of military forces and of violent strikes. The Soviet military advisors to the revolutionary Chinese armies in the 1920 noticed

with great surprise that their “modern”, and in fact Western, concepts of strategy are entirely alien to Chinese generals.<sup>18</sup>

According to Western concepts, war was reduced to the contest of forces, whereas in China, since the times of Sun Zi war constituted a comprehensive operation, which included the political and diplomatic operations, economic preparations, manoeuvres of secret agents, propagandistic actions, etc. The military factor constituted only a part of such state operations. Michalel I. Handel, professor of strategy at the U.S. Naval College, who indicates this difference as crucial between the Western and Chinese military theories, concludes:

Sun Zi’s comprehensive framework for the analysis of strategy and war is much more relevant to our own time than that of Clausewitz  
(M.I. Handel, 1991, 12).

The treatise attributed to Sun Zi initiates considerations on strategy with such a statement:

In general, when resorting to military means,<sup>19</sup> it is better to preserve a state intact than to ruin it, better to preserve an army unharmed than to destroy it, better to keep a battalion, a company, a five-man unit intact rather than break them up. Hence fighting many battles and winning all of them is not supreme excellence; best of all is to subdue the enemy’s troops without fighting.

Therefore the best [kind of] warfare is to attack the [enemy’s] plans; the next best is to attack his relations [with other states]; then comes military attack; and worst of all is attacking walled cities (*Sunzi*, chapter III).

As one could see the term “war” is used here for various kinds of confrontation of other state, even with purely diplomatic means, without troops in the field. Later on its meaning was even enlarged. In an early medieval description of the Three Kingdoms period (220–265), Ma Su 馬謖, Zhuge Liang’s commander states in a discussion with his master:

<sup>18</sup> Vitaliy Primakov (1897–1937), a Soviet military advisor to the National Armies of Feng Yuxiang in the 1920’s describes with horror his discussions with Chinese generals, who understood strategy in such a traditional way. The examples of military actions most admired by them were based on stratagems, and Zhuge Liang was still considered by them the best master (Primakov, 1970, 156, 231–3, 251–2).

<sup>19</sup> The difference of approaches makes even the translation from Chinese to English very difficult. This quotation starts with a phrase: *fu yong bing zhi fa* 夫用兵之法. It had been translated here as: *In general, when resorting to military means*, but it could be interpreted in two ways: 1) *in general, the method of resorting to arms (or to troops, to warfare) consists of...*; 2) *in general, the principle of warfare is...* In the Chinese text “one does not wage war”, but chooses various means of achieving political aims, including these with recourse to arms and greater or smaller use of force.

According to the principle of employing military forces, the best is to attack the minds (gong xin 攻心), and the worst is to attack the strongholds; the best is “war of minds” (xin zhan 心戰), and much worse is “war of troops” (bing zhan 兵戰).<sup>20</sup>

The first part of this sentence repeats Sun Zi’s treatise, but the second goes much further setting “war of minds”, which is much broader than the modern “psychological warfare”, against “war of arms”. The “war of minds” includes not only tricks and artful operations, but also the attacks on enemy’s plans, on the enemy ruler’s will to fight, on the morale of his troops, and even on psyche of his people, whose sympathy should be assured by able propaganda and a humane course of war. The sympathy for the invader instead of own ruler was considered crucial for victory. Wu Qi (d. 381 BC), one of the most renowned Chinese strategists, for the first time indicated the role of such a factor and recommended a particular “war with an utmost care for population”.

The principle “attack on minds is the best” become the most famous concept attributed to Zhuge Liang and a kind of a “proverb”, and it had been formulated in a particular cultural context. The main imperative of Chinese military theoreticians was the reduction of the use of force to the minimum. A well-known work of the 1st century BC indicates precisely, that the use of arms in the course of an interstate confrontation should be reduced as much as possible, since it a worst method.

The master conqueror does not wage wars; the master commander of the army does not use it; the master of battling does not fight. [Enemy’s opposition] should be regulated in the ceremonial hall of the palace (i.e. by diplomacy) and the resistance of [his] army should be broken at a distance. If the ruler carries out the policy of benevolence, he will meet no opposition in the entire world.<sup>21</sup>

This conclusion corresponds to the Confucian concepts, in the version elaborated by Mencius, but similar statements are repeated in several ancient sources Hence this concept could be considered political “common knowledge” passed from generation to generation.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>20</sup> *Sanguo zhi* 三國志 [History of the Three Kingdoms], *Shu shu* 蜀書 (The Book of the Shu State), p. 983 (chapter 39). These words are contained in the commentary of the 5th century, which extensively quotes an earlier source already lost.

<sup>21</sup> *Yan tie lun* 鹽鐵論 [Discourses on Salt and Iron], part I, p.1. E. M. Gale’s partial translation (1931, 4–5) is at this point imprecise and has been used only to a small extent.

<sup>22</sup> See, for instance, *Yi Zhou shu* 逸周書 [The Lost Books of the Zhou Period], part 8, p. 8. The Confucian conclusion is missing there, but the preceding part is more elaborated: “The master of politics does not undertake attacks; the master of attacks does not invade; the master of invasion does not carry ‘punitive expeditions’ (i.e. true military action); the master of punitive expeditions does not form battle arrays; the master of battle arraying does not combat; the master of combating does not fight; the master of fighting does not suffer defeats.” It is a source of un-

These concepts were coherent with the Confucian appreciation of peace and harmony, and condemnation of violence, but they had also other roots. The new ruling elite of administrators-and-scholars considered “mental work” prestigious and noble, and treated with a certain contempt physical labour and the use of force in general. In the Confucian canonical books it is formulated with an extreme clarity:

It is a rule of the former kings that the noblemen (*junzi* 君子) should labour with their minds, and the simple people (“small men”, *xiao ren* 小人) labour with their physical forces.<sup>23</sup>

In the book attributed to Mencius an old saying is quoted that explains such a social division in detail:

Some labour with their minds, and some labour with their physical forces. Those who labour with their minds govern others; those who labour with their forces are governed by others. Those who are governed by others provide them; those who govern others are provided by them (*Mengzi*, IIIA, 4).

The author concludes that this is a “universal principle”.<sup>24</sup> Hence all forms of physical labour and the use of strength were considered “less noble” than intellectual work of scholars and administrators. As it had been mentioned above, in China there were various attitudes to fighting and this differentiation concerned physical strength as well. Chinese scholars disdained activities that required physical strength, including such games and hunting.

The Indo-European peoples kept warrior class in high esteem and it constituted there a ruling class, whereas in China social structure was different. Since the Han period the four social classes were distinguished, which had different legal status and rights: scholars-administrators (*shi* 士), peasants (*nong* 農), artisans (*gong* 工), and merchants (*shang* 商). The first class enjoyed the highest prestige, since scholars served as tutors of the people and administrators of public affairs. The state officials, that enjoyed the highest prestige, were recruited from them. The second class, the peasants that produced food and other essential goods, as for example, textiles, simple pottery, etc. enjoyed a status of “free citizens”. They had all essential rights and various obligations to the state.

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certain provenance, but could contain authentic Zhou and Warring States texts, although they could be edited and complemented with later materials. There are also some differences in various editions of this text. In its *Sibu congkan* edition the later part is abbreviated into: “the master of punitive expedition does not strikes, the master of striking does not combat”. In the *Han shu* 漢書 [History of the Han Dynasty] of the AD 1st century one could read: “The master commander of the army does not form battle arrays (i.e. must not combat); the master of combat does not suffer defeat; and the master of defeats does not suffer an annihilation” (chapter 23, p. 1088). It is quoted there as a commonly known concept.

<sup>23</sup> *Zuozhuan* 左傳, [Mr. Zuo’s Commentary], Xianggong 襄公 9; trans. J. Legge, 1972, vol. 5, 438/440, mod. The text could be composed in the 5th–4th centuries BC.

<sup>24</sup> Trans. J. Legge, 1972, vol. 2, 249–50, mod.

For instance, they had the right to possess fields, could participate at the state examination that opened public career, they had semi-autonomous self-government, etc. Up to the Tang period (618–907) village elders were highly respected figures and could present their opinions on various state affairs even to the emperor himself. On the other hand, peasants had to pay taxes, serve at the armies, and perform *corvée* works. Agriculture was considered a noble occupation, in which—in a symbolic way—even emperor, empress, and the highest official of the state had to participate. The *shi* were closely related to peasants and could be recruited from them. There were, however, two strata of *shi*: “official-scholars” and “scholar-commoners”. The last were much closer to the commoners, although had some privileges and enjoyed higher prestige (Ping-ti Ho, 1962, 35–7).

The artisans and merchants constituted “lower classes”, and had restricted rights. There were various types of artisans. A great number of them were considered a kind of “state workers” employed in numerous state enterprises, who worked and lived under strict administrative control. They could serve at the state manufactures for several months a year, in their free time producing goods for the market, or entirely engage in their private work, although their activity remained under state supervision. The lowest was the position of merchants, who often travelled (leaving their families and abandoning their Confucian duties, first of all to serve their parents), and were engaged in an “ignoble activity”.

The legal status of artisans and merchants was much lower than that of the two “noble” classes. There were restrictions concerning possession of farm land, and a merchant family could be allowed to participate in the state examinations merely in the case of abandoning trade at least for three generations. Of course, the richest merchants were often very influential persons, and could even buy noble titles (Ping-ti Ho, 1980). But their property could be confiscated by the state, since their wealth was considered “suspicious” or even “illegal”. The soldiers in general were recruited in China to the armed forces in the three ways. The first was the recruiting of conscripts (since the Han period there was known a system of registration of grown-up citizens and of their training, then they had to fulfil the active service, and later on they were transferred to the reserve called to arms at the time of war or for training). The second way constituted “hereditary soldiers” from “soldiers families”. They were treated as a kind of semi-free “state servants” deprived of essential citizens’ rights (such as possession of private land and of the achieving the prestigious rank of scholars). Their status was close to other “low social categories”, such as state and private slaves, prison guards, actors, prostitutes, etc. The third way, used in the case of extreme need, was liberation of prisoners or convicts and sending them to the army (usually as separate units). Such practice further discredited the function of soldiers. Of course, there were exceptions, when the tribes of the northern nomads or semi-nomads conquered China’s territory. In such cases in general

their masculine was by their leaders treated as “citizen-soldiers” and became a privileged ruling elite above the traditional Chinese class structure. For the last time such a model was used under the rule of the last Manchu dynasty (1644–1912). The foreign ruling elite usually cultivated its traditional military ethos.

Such a traditional Chinese division into the “four categories of the people” (*simin* 四民) was usually presented as introduced by “ancient sages” (*Han shu*—the *History of the Han dynasty*, ch. 24 A, p.1118). It is mentioned in numerous ancient sources, although earlier, in particular before the Han period (206 BC—AD 220), their “order of prestige” could be altered. For instance, in the *Mr. Zuo’s Commentary* and in the *Book of Master Xun* merchants are enumerated above artisans.<sup>25</sup> In the *Book of Master Guan* peasants are enumerated as the first and scholars as second, since agriculture was considered there a supreme activity most important to the state.<sup>26</sup> In the *Gu Liang’s Commentary* the four classes are enumerated as following; scholars, merchants, peasants and artisans.<sup>27</sup>

As one can see, the distinction of these four “classes” was commonly accepted, although their hierarchy could vary, until the “orthodox” Confucian order prevailed. As one could see, warriors are missing in this social order, and there is no room for them. In fact, situation is much more complex. In the Spring and Autumn Period (770–476 BC) the *shi* were not “scholars”, but constituted a lower stratum of the ruling class of nobles, who cultivated military arts and skills. Great Chinese historian Gu Jiegang 顧頡剛 (1893–1980) outlined their transformation as follows. Initially, in the Western Zhou and at the beginning of the Spring and Autumn periods all *shi* had “military” characteristics and constituted the basis of aristocratic armies. In the period of Confucius, in the 6th–5th century BC, military and civil administrative skills differentiated and two separate types of *shi* started to appear: “civil *shi*” (*wen shi* 文士) and “military *shi*” (*wu shi* 武士), but the old aristocratic elite combined both qualities. It was the reason, why Confucius’ disciples studied the civil and military arts as “obligatory” to a gentleman’. Confucius obviously put an emphasis on studying books and on civil skills.

The process of separation of “warriors” was truly complicated. Gu Jiegang indicates that the archaic “military *shi*”, who fulfilled also some civil, administrative functions, were transformed step by step into scholars-officials, whereas side by side also appeared distinct military figures: warriors and officers. These former were called *ru* 儒—“scholars” (later on it meant also “Confucians”),

<sup>25</sup> *Zuo zhuan*, Xianggong 襄公 9; trans. J. Legge, 1972, vol. 5, 437/440. *Xunzi* 荀子 [The Book of Master Xun], chapter 8; trans. J. Konoblock, 1990, II, 71. It is attributed to the eminent Confucian philosopher Xin Qing 荀卿 (ca. 298–238 BC).

<sup>26</sup> *Guanzi* 管子 [The Book of Master Guan], chapter 48; trans. W.A. Rickett, 1998, II, 179. This chapter was probably written in the 3rd or the 2nd century BC.

<sup>27</sup> *Guliang zhuan* 穀梁傳 [The Gu Liang’s Commentary], Chenggong 成公 5; *Shisanjing*, 2417. Probably written in the 3rd century BC.

whereas the latter were called *xia* 俠—“chivalrous warriors”. The opposition of these scholars and warriors lasted almost for five hundred years, since the Warring States Period (475–221 BC) to the Western Han period (206 BC—AD 24). Even during this time the scholars prevailed, but later on the ancient *xia* entirely disappeared (Gu Jiegang, 1977, 85–91). The analysis of the class division and the position of warriors is analysed here in detail since it appears crucial for the prestige of military activity: a high social and political position of warriors rises the prestige of military skill and ethos, and *vice versa*. The analysis presented above demonstrates well a social basis for the cultural differences of the West.

The Confucian disdain for the physical labour, violence, struggle and war was based on a particular vision of the universe. It was described as “harmonious”. In one of canonical books, *The Doctrine of the Mean*, it is stated:

While there are not strings of pleasure, anger, sorrow, or joy, the mind may be said to be in a state of Equilibrium (中 *zhong*). When these feelings have been stirred and they act in their due degree, there ensues what may be called the state of Harmony (和 *he*). This Equilibrium is the great root of the world, and this Harmony is the universal path (道 *dao*). Let the state of Equilibrium and Harmony exist in perfection, and a happy order will prevail throughout Heaven and Earth, and all things and creatures will be nourished and flourish.<sup>28</sup>

Hence maintaining Harmony and Equilibrium was presented as the fundamental principle of the universe, and as its ideal state. Each its entities should maintain them, and in their mutual relations. Merely under such conditions they could develop and flourish, whereas struggle that break harmonious interrelations was considered destructive and harmful to all beings.

Such concepts were also contained in other Confucian texts. For instance, in the famous *Book of Changes* in the explanation to the hexagram 1 *Qian* 乾 — “The Creative”, which describes the Heaven and condensation of the Yang in general, one can read:

Vast indeed is the [sublime] Creative, it generates all things and beings, and its [power] permeates even Heaven. It causes the clouds to come forth, the rain to bestow its bounty, and all objects and beings to flow reaching their [respective] forms. Its dazzling brilliance [leads them] from their end to the [new] beginning (...) The Way of the Creative consists in alternations and transformations, [granting] to each [object and being] its right nature and

<sup>28</sup> *Zhong yong* 中庸 [The Doctrine of the Mean]; J. Legge, 1972, vol. I, 384–5, trans.mod. This work, considered fundamental, is traditionally attributed to Zi Si 子思 (ca. 483–402 BC), a Confucius’ grandson and an outstanding philosopher himself. Now his authorship is questioned and numerous scholars presume that the text was written or edited around 200 BC. For a detailed analysis of the text and its dating see: Tu Wei-ming, 1989.

destiny. Then it preserves their conformity with the Great Harmony [of the universe].<sup>29</sup>

In the explanation of the hexagram 11 *Tai* 泰 —“Peace”, that grants prosperity and the proper moral order, it is stated:

[With] the Little gone and the Great come, good fortune and success [are granted]. It is so when Heaven and Earth are in intercourse, and all beings are in communion with one another (i.e. in a state of harmonious relatedness). The upper and lower (i.e. ruling and the ruled) unite and have the same will. Inside (i.e. in the Middle State) the Yang prevails and Outside (i.e. on the barbarian periphery) Yin remains. [Thus] the Interior is strong and the Exterior follows it. Inside the noble men [rule] and Outside the people of the low moral standing [obey]. The way of the former waxes, and the way of the latter wanes. [But eventually] walls [that protect the order] will fall back into the moat and disorder and wars will inevitably follow.<sup>30</sup>

It is highly significant that the opposite state of chaos and war is described in the explanations to the hexagram 12 *Pi* 否 —“Standstill” representing the period of decline. One can read there:

The evil of the rebels and usurpers [prevails]; this period is unfavourable to the correctness of noblemen. The Great are gone and the Little came. [It is so, when] Heaven and Earth are disunited and there is no communication among all things and creatures [so they cannot flourish]. The upper and lower [strata, i.e. the ruling and the ruled] are disunited [and they have different wills]; in the world there are no vassal countries [i.e. the leadership of the Son of Heaven is lost, which results in disorders and wars]. In the Interior [i.e. within the Middle State] the Yin predominates, whereas in the Exterior [i.e. in the barbarian lands] Yang is diffused. The Interior is weak and the Exterior strong. The people of low moral standing [rule] the Interior, whereas the noble men [appears] in the Exterior. The way of the low people flourishes, and the way of noblemen decays... [But] the period of evil must come to the end, it cannot last forever<sup>31</sup>.

As one could see, the *Book of Changes* presents history as cyclical predomination of periods of “order” (治 *zhi*) and of “chaos” (亂 *luan*), which follow one another. Each of these states develops from an embryo to its apex, and then declines up to its nadir, and gives the room to the opposite. Wars, rebellions and

<sup>29</sup> *Zhou yi zheng yi* 周易正義 [The Correct Meaning of the Book of Changes of the Zhou Epoch], *Shisanjing*, p. 14 (chapter 1). The two translations have been used here to some extent: by Wilhelm, R., 1983, 4–5; Blofeld, J., 1968, 85.

<sup>30</sup> *Zhou yi...*, 28–9 (chapter 2); cf. Wilhelm, 48–9; Blofeld, 110; trans. mod.

<sup>31</sup> *Zhou yi...*, 29 (chapter 2); cf. Wilhelm, 52–3.



foreign invasions happen in the period of chaos, when Yin and Yang reverse their proper positions, whereas peace and harmony characterise the period of their “normal state”. Hence a founder of a new dynasty, who receives the Mandate of Heaven (*tianming* 天命) and restores order, begins a new cycle of “order”. His success, however, depends not only on his virtues and on the will of Heaven, but also on this “cosmic pulse” of the universe: he could succeed merely when the period of chaos is ending.

The *Romance of the Three Kingdoms*, mentioned above, the most popular Chinese fiction until the 20th century, initiates with such a quotation of a proverbial truth:

The fundamental pattern of the world (*tianxia* 天下) is this: long divided, must unite; long united must divide.<sup>32</sup>

So, the human efforts of the heroes who wanted to restore a political order in the empire and unite again the world known to them were destined to a failure from the very beginning. At this time China was entering the new period of division and wars which human efforts could not stop. The world known to the Chinese, and identified with the system of their empire, passed inevitable cyclical changes: of order, unity and peace, and of chaos, divisions and wars.

The process of change consists—as it was presumed by Confucian thinkers of the imperial epoch—in eternal cyclical transmutations from Yin to Yang and again to Yin. They complement one another, not oppose, as the God and Satan in Christian thought. All beings were generated through their union, and Yin-Yang balance determined their development and decline. Thus co-operation, communion, fertile intercourse—constitute the fundamental principle of the universe and of the society. Harmony, unity and conformity were considered the ideal and the most beneficial state, whereas conflicts, strife, disorders and wars were disdained, as breaking this unity and harmony. These both states were, however, inevitable, since the peace and order could not be preserved forever. But man should restore order as soon as it is possible, since peace and harmony constitute the “proper” order and are “fertile” and “creative”, not chaos and strife.

Such concepts had been shared to a large extent by other school of thought. For instance, in the fundamental Taoist text, *The Book of the Way and the Virtue* one finds such statements:

*He who assists the ruler according to the Way does not [seek]  
to dominate the world with arms.  
The use of arms usually brings requital.  
Wherever armies are stationed, briars and thorns grow.*

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<sup>32</sup> Luo Guanzhong, *Sanguo...*, vol. 1, p. 1 (chapter 1); see also the English trans. by M. Roberts, 1994, vol. 1, p. 5 (mod.).

*Great wars are always followed by famines.  
 A master [in generalship] achieves [with arms] the purpose  
 and stops,  
 But dares not to dominate the world (...)  
 He achieves his purpose but does not boast about it.  
 He achieves his purpose but is not proud of it.  
 He achieves his purpose [using force] but only when it is  
 unavoidable.  
 Fine weapons are instruments of bad luck,  
 And all beings hate them.  
 Therefore those who follow the Way turns away from them (...)  
 Only when it cannot be avoided, [the ruler] makes recourse to them,  
 and regards calm restraint the best.  
 Even when he is victorious, he does not regard it as  
 praiseworthy,  
 For to praise victory is to delight in the slaughter of men.  
 He who delights in the slaughter of men will never get what he  
 looks for [out of those that dwell] in the world (...)  
 The army that has slain men is received with grief and  
 mourning;  
 [The commander] who won in battles is received with rites of  
 mourning.<sup>33</sup>*

There was even coined a proverb:

Weapons are disastrous, war is dangerous (bing xiong zhan wei 兵凶戰危).<sup>34</sup>

Even the works of strategists, the recognised experts in war, supported such opinions. For instance the *Book of Master Wei Liao* (尉繚子 *Weiliaozi*), included in the *Military Classics*, states:

Military forces are a tool of disaster, and war contradicts the Virtue.<sup>35</sup>

Hence in the Chinese Empire there were no monuments or arcs of triumph built up to celebrate military victories and no commander could hope for “eternal glory”, or a triumphal reception in the capital with his victorious army,

<sup>33</sup> *Laozi dao de jing* [The Book of the Way and the Virtue by Laozi], *Zhuzi jicheng*, vol. 3, pp. 17–8 (paragraphs 30–31); trans., Chan, Wing-tsit, 1963, 152–4, mod.

<sup>34</sup> See Tong Yubin, Tong Zhou, 1996, 70-1. It is an abbreviated form of the ancient statement: “weapons are a tool of evil, and war is a dangerous affair”. According to these authors it originates from a Han period text *The Commentary on the Explanation of Military Affairs* (言兵事疏 *Yan bing shi shu*), composed by Chao Cuo 晁錯 (200–154 BC), a statesman and scholar. This statement had been quoted in numerous later works.

<sup>35</sup> *Weiliaozi* 尉繚子, chapter 5 (section 23), vol. 11, 976; trans. Sawyer, 1993, 273, mod.

which the Romans would offer him. Victories had been celebrated merely at the very end of the Qianlong epoch (1736–1795) under the Jesuits' influence. An exceptional character of this initiative is confirmed by ordering one hundred sets of 16 cartoons representing victories of this emperor as copper engravings in Paris (after pictures by G. Castiglione). The emperor intended to present them to other rulers and to important guests (J. Waley-Cohen, 2006; T. Szrajber, 2006).

This move obviously contradicted official ideology of the Empire. According to the Confucian concepts, the recourse to the arms was considered a political failure, since the dangers should be prevented or eliminated in their embryo forms by political and diplomatic means. Thus a military campaign demonstrated that the ruler and his advisors were not enlightened enough or not versed in the subtle art of politics. Moreover, as the Confucians maintained, the Son of Heaven should possess the True Virtue and administer his empire so well, that everybody would subdue to him and recognise his superiority. Thus voluntary obedience confirmed his Virtue and legitimised his power, whereas the necessity to subdue somebody by force could put under question the legitimacy of his power. Therefore a defeat could result easily in widespread rebellions.

It was a duty of the Son of Heaven to punish the “rebels” and restore order within the empire and on its frontiers. But according to this logic a “military punitive campaign” was considered the most severe punishment, and the commander who executed such “rebels” and restored order could not count on the “fame of hero”. His action was not a duel with a noble foe, like these of Homeric heroes, or medieval European knights, but was rather similar to police suppression of riots and disorders. Hence war offered no “divine glory” and did not involve deep feelings related to “a communion with transcendence”. Conquests were condemned as “wrong” and “dangerous” to the state.

Moreover, the Confucian scholars elaborated a particular concept of “civilisation” that contributed much to the disdain for violence. It is related to the mentioned above separation of *wen* and *wu*. Civilisation was identified with *wen* 文—that originally meant, “design”, “ornate”, but later on literature, culture, and moral education. Its antonym or counterpart is *wu* 武—“bellicose”, “martial”, and “violent” (but it originates from a complex pictogram meaning “protecting with arms”). Hence “civilisation” by its very nature was considered “peaceful”, whereas the “barbarians” were inevitably bellicose and violent (see: Gawlikowski, 1987, 398–433). The process of “civilising” (*wen hua* 文化) was understood as “cultural transformation of human beings”. That is absorption of “culture”, with its ritualised norms of behaviour, restraint of biological stimuli, duties and virtues, etc., in the process of self-perfection, created human nature in each individual. According to these concepts we do not born “humans”, but become humane in the complex social process of education and self-perfection.

Since Confucian ideology dominated in China, harmony, equilibrium and peace were considered central values and the essential principles of the cosmic,

political and social order. Even one's own self was portrayed as "harmonious", whereas the concepts of "spiritual struggle" and of "moral choice" (which required freedom) were unknown. Self-perfection and adjustment to the outside world, social and natural alike, determined behaviour of groups and of individuals, not the struggle (for freedom, prestige, or profits, to subordinate others, etc.). The society and its members were duty- not rights-oriented. Instead the dualism of Evil/Good there was used a bipolar scheme of Yin and of Yang, which complement each other and generated one another. The eminent Chinese scholars rightly indicate that Harmony and maintaining peace are the crucial Confucian and Chinese values. They also point out that in this respect China differs from the West, where war, struggle and conflict are appreciated and considered "normal" and "fruitful" (Zhang Tainian, Cheng Yishan, 1998, 89–93, 209–11). It could be added that struggle and competition constitutes the way of life in the West, and "winning" gives enormous satisfaction and prestige to the victorious party, whereas in the Confucian civilisation maintaining consensus, group loyalty and obedience to a "leader" are most appreciated. Such principles are practised in villages and in the most advanced cities, in Japan, Singapore and other countries. It is worthy to quote here the five principles adopted as "shared values" at the beginning of the 1990's in Singapore:

- *Nation before community and society above self.*
- *Family as the basic unit of the society.*
- *Community support and respect for the individual.*
- *Consensus, not conflict.*
- *Racial and religious harmony.*<sup>36</sup>

Yang Guoshu, a renown Taiwanese psychologist, who promoted an "indigenisation" of psychology to adapt the concepts elaborated by Western psychologists to local Chinese conditions, agrees that the cultural differences concerning struggle/harmony are essential. He concludes that the traditional Chinese social interrelations are based on the principle of harmony, not on conflict management, as in the West, and this needs further studies in Taiwan (Huang Lili, 1999, iii). One should bear in mind that in the result of the traditional Chinese education it was even difficult to express disagreement, criticism (in particular to respected persons) or simple saying "no". Until today it is considered in the Confucian cultures impolite. Hence there are popular books, which advise "how to say no" in an indirect and polite way (see, for instance, Ishikawa Hiroyoshi, 1994).

Recently the concepts, which put an emphasis on a particular appreciation of harmony in China and avoidance of struggle and war, provoked debates and

<sup>36</sup> On January 2nd, 1991 these values had been adopted in the "White Paper on Shared Values" presented to the Parliament by command of the President of the Republic of Singapore. Later on the school education and civic life had been based on them. See: J. S. T. Quah, 1998, Appendix A, pp. 106–116.

various controversies. As numerous new studies demonstrate, wars played significant role in the evolution of the Chinese state and in Chinese history in general (see N. di Cosmo, 2009; A. Lorge, 2005; D. A. Graff, 2002). Alastair I. Johnston is also right pointing out that in practice wars have not been avoided by rulers of the Chinese empire, and bloodshed had not been so reduced, as one could expect reading merely Chinese strategic and philosophical literature (Johnston, 1995, 27). As Peter C. Perdue indicates, *Chinese history is full of examples of the ruthless, offensive use of military force against weaker enemies for territorial expansion* (P.C. Perdue, 2000, 255). The state, even adopting the Confucian ideology, had not been as peaceful and non aggressive as one could expect, although the conflicts mentioned here concerned rather border security and small border lands than large conquests similar to those by the Romans, the Mongols or the British.

Several scholars, as Huiyun Feng (2007, 141–3), maintain that in the studies of China there are essentially the two orientations. One of them represents the works by the “older sinologists”, who put an emphasis on the pacific nature of Chinese civilisation (as (J. Needham, K. Gawlikowski, 1994; F. Kierman, J. K. Fairbank, 1974). The second orientation represent the studies by the contemporary “realists”, who indicate that China do not differ much in waging wars from European powers (the most prominent among them is A. Johnston, 1995). It seems, that such statements oversimplify the real differences of opinions. Those “older sinologists” actually did not indicate simply that the Chinese “are in general pacific” and avoided or did not wage wars. They maintained instead that the Chinese *ways of dealing with other states* often were significantly different from those used in the West. The preferences for the use of “soft power” reduced the scale of conquests and of bloodshed, but did not eliminate wars at all. The difference concerns the *political preferences and solutions*. One should also consider the ability and will to create a significant military potential. Moreover, as it had been indicated at the beginning of this study, Chinese civilisation underwent significant changes (ignored by Johnston). In the Qing period (1644–1912) the Empire carried out a much more aggressive policy than before, and after the Opium Wars the absorption of the Western military techniques and spirit advanced quickly. As it had been stated at the beginning, China and the western countries represented in the past an “aggressive type of culture”. The essential difference consists in *enjoying destruction and killing* in the West and *of achieving prestige by such actions*, whereas in China such elements were missing. The comparison of wars waged by the both sides is not sufficient, a wider perspective on entire politics of the state would be necessary.

The problem of violence in Chinese culture is certainly complex. Each scholar, who studied social history of this country is well aware of its diffused use, even within families and clans, which life was officially determined by the Confucian norms (see, for instance Ch’ü T’ung-ts’u, 1961). Hence A. I. Johnston, who indicates that there was an enormous disparity between the normative

ideal of minimal violence and actual strategic practice is certainly right. The Confucian norms often had been broken, and the Chinese were aware that there are spheres and periods where and when the Confucian norms are not applied. The separation of *Wen* and *Wu* constitutes one of the examples. One should also bear in mind that the ruling Manchu dynasty adopted the Confucian ideology, but maintained a large part of its native, northern culture of steppes and of forests. The Manchus created a particular military organisation for their native population (the Eight Banners) in line with the old steppe traditions, and they tried to preserve their bellicose traditions. Hence it is not surprising that they carried out military conquests on an unprecedented scale, comparable merely to the Yuan, Mongol dynasty (1279–1368).

Moreover, already in the 18th century, when the Chinese Empire faced challenge of the European powers and employed at the court the Europeans to learn from them their alien culture, various Western influences could be seen not only in architecture, painting, etc. The Manchu rulers started, for instance, to venerate military virtues and their own victories. One could even pose a question: was this ostensible “militaristic policy” true or adopted mostly to impress the Europeans?

Real policy of the Chinese Empire was obviously complex, and political practice could contradict declared principles as it happens in every state. One could remind, for instance, that the US, notwithstanding their declared love for freedom and democracy, have supported the bloody coup d'état in Chile by gen. Pinochet and other most brutal dictatorships in Latin America, or the Red Khmers in Cambodia after the Vietnamese intervention. This does not mean that the official ideology of the state is insignificant at all, and that it makes no difference whether the state adopts fascist or liberal-democratic ideology. The situation of the Chinese Empire was similar: its ideology *in the long run* determined the general lines of its policy, the ethos of its political life and the state institutions ways of operating, but the state inevitably had to use its military forces. As in the case of contemporary wars waged by the US Army, the imperial Chinese armies of the past were able to justify them. They waged merely “just wars”: “prevented aggression” or “punished invaders”; changed the regime, which oppressed its own people; punished the rulers, who invaded their weaker neighbours, etc. According to its Confucian ideology, the Empire maintained peace and moral order in the world. Halting such interventions and punitive expeditions would be, from this point of view, inhumane.

This does not mean that the imperial Chinese policy was similar to that of the contemporary US. During the last centuries of the Empire, its strategic theory put an emphasis on “winning through defence”, hence predominated a defensive orientation. Moreover, as a Russian expert of Chinese affairs, a colonel of the General Staff, noticed in the 19th century: a great number of troops dispersed throughout the country does not mean that there is an army, since these troops maintain various standards and their concentration to form one force was

always extremely difficult and time-consuming (D.V. Putyata, 1895, 174). Each administrative unit had its guards, military men, and policemen performing various tasks. For this reason the British officers of that period maintained that one could invade China with merely a ten thousand Western soldiers. It is true that China waged numerous wars in the Qing period, but still one should bear in mind that the Empire was very weak in this respect as the Opium Wars have demonstrated. This situation started to change at the end of the 19th century when modern armies have been organised and China under the Western influence adopted the militaristic and national ideologies. China wanted to follow the Western example and to compete with Western powers and with westernised Japan, but failed in these efforts.

##### **5. THE CONTEMPORARY CHANGES: A NEW RETURN TO HARMONY**

As numerous scholars indicate the first “great divergence” of the Western and Chinese civilisations happened approximately in the middle of the 1st millennium BC (B. Wittrock, 2005, 51; W. Scheidel, 2009, 20–23). Since this time, in general, the two civilisations developed in different ways.

The next turning point in China’s history happened at the middle of the 19th century, in the period western invasions on China at the course of so called Opium Wars (1839–1842, 1858, 1860). Under the Western influence the Chinese started to change their traditional attitudes to the military sphere. The Western-type belligerent attitudes were adopted by various political groupings. These ideological and cultural changes resulted also from the general diffusion of militaristic forms of organisation in the Chinese countryside during the Taiping Rebellion (1851–1864). It could be seen on the side of the rebels and on the side of the forces that confronted them. This happened mostly in the South, but in the North a similar effect had the Boxer Uprising (1899–1901). A new militaristic ideology propagated also the so-called New Armies, which started to use western weapons and patterns of organisation. Under such circumstances the Manchu and Chinese state officials and generals started to promote much more militaristic policy and ideas, which culminated in 1905 reforms, when the traditional Confucian civil examinations were abolished and the system of military schools and academies had been introduced instead. It was expected that military cadres instead of Confucian scholars would govern the empire. The Chinese revolutionaries also made recourse to force and arms, and they imagined their forces as a kind of an “army”. It is highly significant that the most popular revolutionary pamphlet of 1903 had been entitled *the Revolutionary Army* (see: Tsou Jung, 1968).

Social-Darwinist concepts, which put an emphasis on struggle and competition of “races” and nations, were widely diffused in China in the 1920’s and 1930’s. Various revolutionary and civil wars marked this period, and it ended with the Japanese invasion on China during the World War II and a new civil

war in the 1940's, which resulted in the victory of the Communists and the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949. Fascination with struggle and war reached an apex during the Cultural Revolution period (1966–1969), when the slogans of “class struggle” shaped worldview and social realities. It is highly symbolic that Mao personally recommended to a girl of the Red Guards, named Song Bonbin, to change her name: from a traditional one “Gentle” (Binbin 彬彬) to “Be Bellicose” (Yao Wu 要武) (S. Karnow, 1972, 203). In a paradoxical way China confronted the West in the most radical way owing to bellicose ideologies adopted from the West.

In this period, however, after more than two thousand years, the West started a fundamental re-evaluation of its bellicose traditions. Criticism of war-mongering policy became diffused and various new institutions have been established, like the United Nations and European Union, to grant peace and harmonious co-operation among nations. The Cold War and nuclear armaments demonstrated that the powers of the western world (the USSR included) could even annihilate entire mankind, which horrified various social circles.

China also initiated a great revision of her belligerent Marxist ideology. In the period of reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1978 a partial revival of the traditional culture, including Confucianism, started. And at the beginning of the 21st century the idea of harmony appeared again in Chinese politics. For instance the Prime Minister Wen Jiabao in his Harvard speech (Dec. 10, 2003) explained to the American audience the fundamental value of harmony in such a way:

The Chinese nation has rich and profound cultural reserves. “Harmony without uniformity” is a great idea put forth by ancient Chinese thinkers. It means harmony without sameness, and difference without conflict. Harmony entails co-existence and co-prosperity, while difference conduces to mutual complementation and mutual support. To approach and address issues from such a perspective will not only help enhance relations with friendly countries, but also serve to resolve contradictions in the international community (...)

Today, mankind is in the middle of a period of drastic social change. It would be wise approach for all countries to carry forward their fine cultural heritages by tracing back their origins, passing on the essentials, learning from one another and breaking new grounds (Wen Jiabao, 2003).

It may be considered a right description of this fundamental Confucian concept. It reflected a new way of thinking and of presenting China's heritage to the world.

President Hu Jintao also advocated this new approach. In September 2004, at the 4th Plenary Session of Central Committee of the Communist Party of China of the 16th term he for the first time presented the concept of “harmonious development”. At the party conference on February 19, 2005, he outlined such policy, and since this time the concept of “harmonious society” (*hexie shehui* 和



諧社會) at home and calls for “harmonious Asia”, or “harmonious world of enduring peace and common prosperity” become a leitmotivs of the Chinese domestic and foreign policy. Hu at various international events indicated that harmony is a “defining value of the Chinese civilisation” (Hu Jintao, Nov. 2006).

In his lecture at the Yale University (April 21, 2006) he explained this concept as follows:

The Chinese civilisation has always given prominence to social harmony, unity and mutual assistance. Back in the early days of the Chinese nation, the Chinese already advocated that “harmony is most valuable”. They strove for harmony between man and nature, among people and between man’s body and soul, and yearned for an ideal society where “everyone loves everyone else, everyone is equal and the whole world is one community”.

Today, China is endeavouring to build a harmonious society. It is a society of democracy and rule of law, fairness and justice, integrity, fraternity, vitality, stability, order and harmony between man and nature [Hu Jintao, Apr. 2006].

These concepts could, as it appears, influence Chinese politics and social mentality, since they are deeply rooted in the national culture, and respond to practical needs as well. They could also attract attention in East Asia, where such ideas are shared by many nations. Unfortunately, they will be much less convincing to Western politicians and societies, since such concepts appear there alien and “artificial”, although aspirations for peace and harmony became diffused. After the end of the Cold War, the West started to condemn wars, aggression, and violence with surprising vigour, promoting peace and human rights. Hence its cultural heritage essentially changes after several millennia of belligerency, and two great civilisations, Chinese and western, started to follow similar paths, this time closer to the Chinese traditions.

Notwithstanding this rapprochement, some old differences related to fundamental archetypes of antagonistic or complementary dualism remain and the West maintains essential elements of its belligerent heritage (including its democratic ideals based on competition). On the other hand, in China one could find a mix of various elements: of Confucian traditions, of the previous belligerent world view absorbed from the West, as well as recently adopted elements of western concepts, institutions and values. Hence a truly constructive, peaceful and harmonious co-operation would not be easy. There also remain fundamental differences of values and aspirations. As in the early 1990’s David I. Hitchcock demonstrated (1994), merely 7% of the Americans appreciated

“harmony”, whereas it was essential for 58% percents of the East Asians.<sup>37</sup> Maintaining “consensus” appreciated even less of the Americans, merely 4%, but 39% of the East Asians. In East Asia the ideal of an “orderly society” appreciated 71%, and it was most important value there, whereas in America a perfect social order selected merely 11%. For the Americans the most important were “free expression” (85%, but merely 47% of the Asians), “personal freedom” (82%, 32% of the Asians), and “individual rights” (78%, 29% of the Asians). Hence reaching mutual understanding would be a difficult task, although the Asians, the Europeans, and the Americans accept the idea of dialogue among cultures and civilisations.

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<sup>37</sup> He carried out his surveys in China, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore, but there were merely 100 respected local leaders. Hence the results could be treated merely as preliminary.

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